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Abstract
Effects of nonlinguistic context on language production
Brendan Barnwell
Recent usage-based approaches to linguistic theory have claimed that linguistic process-
ing is driven by domain-general cognitive abilities which operate on a rich memory store
that retains all the details of every experience with language, extracting patterns from these
experiences purely on the basis of regular patterning. It has also been claimed that these
mechanisms operate similarly on all levels of linguistic structure and at all stages of the
human lifespan. Taken together, these claims imply the hypothesis that any dimension of
experience can influence the linguistic knowledge and behavior of any language user. This
dissertation tests this hypothesis.
A series of experiments were conducted, each consisting of a prime phase and a test
phase, using native English-speaking participants. In the prime phase, participants were
exposed to combinations of linguistic structures (active and passive voice) and nonlinguis-
tic contextual elements (colors, background music, sounds, or physical environments). The
linguistic and nonlinguistic components of the experiences so created bore no semantic re-
lationship to one another, but the pattern of cooccurrence between them was completely
regular and reliable, such that, for each experimental participant, a particular syntactic
voice always occurred in a particular nonlinguistic context. Participants then performed a
picture description task, in which each picture was accompanied by one of the nonlinguis-
tic contexts to which they had previously been exposed. The hypothesis was that, when
describing each picture, participants should be more likely to use the syntactic voice which
had previously been associated with the nonlinguistic context which accompanied the pic-
ture.
This hypothesis was not supported by the data. Instead, it was found that the only
consistently significant factor influencing the syntactic voice of participants’ responses was
the syntactic voice of their own previous responses: people were more likely to keep us-
ing whatever voice they had already been using. In addition, in every experiment, it was
vi
found that the results were most accurately characterized by an extremely simple model
using only subject-specific and picture-specific baseline response rates. These results sug-
gest that usage-based theories have been overly optimistic in asserting that regular patterns
of experience alone are sufficient to explain linguistic knowledge and behavior. Instead,
it is argued that more specific constraints on linguistic processing mechanisms are needed
in order to provide a full-fledged, causal account of how people’s experiences affect their
mental representations of language.
vii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Recent usage-based theories in linguistics have posited that mental representations of lan-
guage arise from domain-general pattern-recognition processes operating on memories of
specific experiences with language. There is considerable evidence for many parts of this
claim: evidence that some pattern-recognition processes are domain-general, evidence that
language use involves engagement of nonlinguistic cognition, evidence that detailed mem-
ories of language are stored. However, the theoretical conception of the usage-based frame-
work involves a synthesis of these disparate observations into a more cohesive whole, and
a significant gap remains between the evidence supporting the parts and evidence support-
ing the overall theory that integrates them. That is, results from several different lines
of research appear to be converging toward a particular view of how language structure
is mentally represented and constructed, but these lines of research do not quite meet in
the middle to provide a unified account of how all of the pieces work together. Substan-
tial questions remain about how claims and findings from different research areas can be
integrated into a broader characterization of how language structure arises through usage.
An important consequence of this is that the boundaries of the theory remain untested
in some places. Memory and pattern-recognition are extremely broad areas of cognition;
when combined with claims of domain-generality, they give rise to a theory that risks being
“too powerful” in the sense that it may make a vast array of predictions beyond what it
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was intended to explain. This does not mean that the overall theory is incorrect, but it
may mean that the details need to be ironed out. For instance, what are the constraints
on the patterns that can be learned according to the theory? What are the constraints on
what kinds of elements may constitute the patterns? What are the constraints on what
aspects of experience are recorded in memory and accessible to the pattern-recognition
system? If the domain-general cognitive system can recognize a given pattern, does that
automatically mean that that pattern is available for incorporation into language, or is the
linguistic system selective, such that there are patterns which can be learned but which
cannot be integrated into language?
Finally, despite the appeal to domain-general faculties of memory and pattern recog-
nition, discussion of these theories within linguistics has remained almost wholly limited
to linguistic memory and the recognition of linguistic patterns. Although it is obviously
natural for linguistic research to be focused on language, it is also true that recruitment
of domain-general processes brings with it an accountability to the total facts about those
processes, as it were in all their domain-general glory. Thus, for instance, if it is claimed
that memory is crucially involved in the construction of linguistic representations, it is in-
cumbent upon the claimants to explain how these processes of memory are related to and
consistent with what is known about memory in general. In other words, simply saying
that a process works by means of memory does not preclude the possibility that it relies
on a highly domain-specific sort of memory; “memory” as invoked in a linguistic theory is
not really a domain-general process unless there is some evidence that known facts about
memory in other domains also apply in the linguistic context.
In this dissertation, I address some of these questions. The general approach is to
take several of the core tenets of the usage-based theory and derive some hypotheses that
apparently ought to be true if all of these core tenets are taken at face value. I test these
hypothesis using experimental studies that combine paradigms from linguistic work and
memory research. To begin with, in the following sections, I describe in more detail the
claims of the usage-based theory, as well as the evidence adduced in support of them, and
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I identify the areas where the different components of the overall theory do not mesh
smoothly.
1.1 Components of the usage-based theory
I use the term “the usage-based theory of language” (or UBTL) to refer to the emerging
nexus of theoretical perspectives which posit that language structure is dervied from pat-
terns of use as modulated by domain-general cognitive processing. In the strictest sense,
there is of course no “the” (i.e., single) usage-based theory, since the theory is the result
of the accumulation of work by many researchers over decades, and these researchers have
not always been in exact agreement. Nonetheless, as described above, this accumulation
has given rise to a common collection of principles relied on by many researchers pursuing
variations on what I call “the usage-based theory”. Other authors have used similar termi-
nology to refer to this broad research orientation (Bybee 2007; Bybee and Beckner 2009;
Croft 2001; Ibbotson 2013; Langacker 1987; Tomasello 2000). Simply put, the fundamen-
tal claim of the UBTL is that “the structures of language emerge from interrelated patterns
of experience, social interaction, and cognitive processes” (Beckner et al. 2009).
Bybee (2010) is the most direct and comprehensive statement of the overall theoretical
perspective, and in other work Bybee (Bybee 2001, 2007; Bybee and Hopper 2001; Bybee
et al. 1994, among many others) has been a leading proponent of this view, as well as a
leading provider of evidence in support of it. Bybee and Beckner (2009) is a concise state-
ment of the fundamentals of this theoretical approach. Lines of research contributing to the
usage-based theory include construction grammar (e.g. Croft 2001; Fillmore et al. 1988;
Goldberg 1995, 2006), constructivist language-acquisition work (e.g. Akhtar and Tomasello
1997; Ellis 2001; Goldberg et al. 2004; Lieven et al. 1997; Pine and Lieven 1993, 1997;
Tomasello 1992, 2000), cognitive corpus linguistics (e.g. Redington et al. 1998; Stefanow-
itsch and Gries 2003), functionalist psycholinguistics (e.g. Boyd et al. 2009; Gurevich et al.
2010; Saffran et al. 1999), and, in a broader sense, a wide array of typological/functionalist
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linguistic literature (e.g. Croft 2003; Givón 1979; Haiman 1985; Hopper 1987; Hopper
and Thompson 1980; Thompson 1988, 1998; Tomasello 1998). Some of the earliest work
within each of these lines was more isolated from work in the others, but in more recent
years there has been a greater degree of integration and combining of the different compo-
nents (as suggested by the appearance of some researchers’ names in more than one of the
citation lists above). (Beckner et al. 2009), in an overview of the UBTL position, highlight
relevant work in numerous research areas.
I emphasize that, although I will of necessity draw on work bymany previous researchers
in summarizing the usage-based position, I do not wish to be understood as restricting “the
UBTL” to any particular researcher, set of researchers, or ideological camp. Rather, by “the
UBTL” I mean, more or less, “everything that the research community currently knows,
understands, and hypothesizes about how language is shaped by patterns of use”. Thus,
in an appropriate metaphorical twist, the UBTL is itself emergent — although much of
the explicit articulation of the theory’s conceptual machinery has come fairly recently, that
machinery was not recently invented but built up gradually over decades, and continues to
evolve. Importantly, although I will have much to say about problems within the UBTL as
it exists now, the proposed solution to these problems maintains the fundamental goal of
explaining language via usage, and thus this dissertation is (or attempts to be) another step
in the UBTL’s evolution, not a move away from the UBTL or a proposal of an alternative.
Four principles of the UBTL are of central concern for present purposes: first, the theory
takes domain-general cognition as a starting point for the creation of linguistic structure;
second, the theory regards memory of specific experiences with language as the rawmaterial
from which structure is extracted; third, the theory essentially rejects a priori distinctions
between levels of linguistic structure, arguing that all levels are represented similarly; and
fourth, the theory posits that the mental representations of language arising from domain-
general cognition and memory are subject to change throughout the lifespan (not only
during language acquisition in childhood).
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1.1.1 Domain-general cognition
Let us turn our attention first to the issue of domain-general cognition. It is important to
note that the UBTL does not take it as a proven fact that domain-general cognition can
explain language; nor is domain generality an “assumption” in the sense that it is taken as
an axiom that is treated as true without proof. Rather, taking domain-general cognition as a
starting point is a practical strategic choice made to minimize the likelihood of overlooking
parsimonious and maximally explanatory theories:
[A]re the processes that give us linguistic structure specific to language or are
they processes that also apply in other cognitive domains? The best strategy
for answering this question is to start first with domain­general processes and
see how much of linguistic structure can be explained without postulating pro-
cesses specific to language. If this quest is even partially successful, we will have
narrowed down the possible processes that have to be specific to language. The
opposite strategy of assuming processes specific to language will not lead to the
discovery of how domain­general processes contribute to linguistic structure.
(Bybee 2010: 6-7)
More succinctly, the UBTL takes up the challenge issued by Lindblom et al. (1984, em-
phasis in the original) to “derive language from nonlanguage!”
Thus, domain-generality is not really part of the content of the UBTL so much as a
guiding principle of research practice. The UBTL aims to explain as much as possible in
terms of domain-general processes, but is not committed to the claim that all of language,
or even any particular aspect of language, can necessarily be so explained.
Since domain-generality is not part of the content of the UBTL, it is not subject to
falsification as such. In principle, the UBTL could evolve into something that relies totally
on language-specific mechanisms, with no role left for domain-general cogition. Because
the UBTL is neutral on the actual importance of domain-general cognition, it requires
affirmative demonstrations of that importance. Since the goal is to “see how much of
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linguistic structure can be explained without postulating processes specific to language”, the
UBTL puts the onus on its own practitioners to demonstrate just how much of linguistic
structure can be so explained. Many such demonstrations have in fact been offered, and
some will be mentioned in the following discussion.
Bybee (2010: 7-9) identifies five domain-general processes of interest to the UBTL:
categorization, chunking, rich memory storage, analogy, and cross-modal association. I
have already identified memory as a separate key component of the UBTL, and I defer
discussion of it for the moment. Among the remaining features, the two that are of greatest
relevance to this dissertation are cross-modal association and chunking.
Cross-modal association
Cross-modal association is the ability to form associative links between disparate aspects
of experience. Bybee as well as Ellis (1996) link this to the Law of Contiguity. Although
the concept goes back to Aristotle’s On Memory and Reminisces and perhaps even to Plato’s
Phaedo, the more modern touchstone for associationist theory is William James (1890,
chap. XIV), who gave the name “Law of Contiguity” to the principle that
objects once experienced together tend to become associated in the imagination,
so that when any one of them is thought of, the others are likely to be thought
of also, in the same order of sequence or coexistence as before.
Ellis (2001) discusses a number of wrinkles associated with applying this law. In particular,
there is the question of exactly which elements of experience are available for association.
According to Ellis (2001, 42, emphasis in the original), “The implicit pattern-detection
processes that occur within these modalities of representation [i.e., sensory modalities] en-
tail that any such cross-modal associations typically occur between the highest chunked level
of activated node.” Bybee (2010: 8) likewise says that “meaning is assigned to the largest
chunk available: a word, a phrase or a construction.”
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There has been a good deal of work demonstrating this in various contexts. Much of it
has focused on associations formed in language acquisition. Notably, Akhtar (1999) devel-
oped a “weird word order” paradigm, subsequently used also by others (e.g. Casenhiser and
Goldberg 2005; Theakston et al. 2004), in which children heard a syntactic construction
that used a word order that was ungrammatical for adults in their language (for instance,
SOV order for English-speaking children) while also watching video scenes depicting a par-
ticular semantic situation. The construction was exemplified using several different verbs.
In experiments including those just cited, it has been repeatedly found that young chil-
dren will readly associate the “meaning” — that is, the common semantic thread of the
visual scenes — with the construction. Crucially, the meaning is linked to the syntactic
pattern, not to the individual verbs; children can generalize the syntactic knowledge thus
acquired to use the construction with new verbs. A similar paradigm has been used with
adult subjects (e.g. Boyd et al. 2009), who are also able to extract the generalization, al-
though less readily. (Adult acquisition of the syntactic frame has only been shown with
forced-choice recognition tasks; adults will not spontaneously produce the “weird word or-
der” construction. Apparently, then, even when cross-modal associations can be formed,
they may not be fully “available” to linguistic processing, in the sense of acting to influence
both comprehension and production.)
Also relevant is work within simulation semantics (e.g. Bergen andWheeler 2010; Glen-
berg and Kaschak 2002; Zwaan et al. 2002), which has demonstrated that sensory and mo-
tor cognition is activated during language processing. This work suggests that cross-modal
associations are formed between, for instance, the word push and the physical motion of the
arm away from the body, such that comprehension of the word activates motor programs
associated with the motion.
Computational modeling also has shown that structure can be extracted from fairly
messy input even by algorithms that make use only of general distributional information.
Stevenson and collaborators (e.g. Alishahi et al. 2008; Alishahi and S. Stevenson 2008; Fa-
zly et al. 2008; Mathe et al. 2008) have developed computational models which, using very
7
general (i.e., not language-specific) probabilistic procedures, learn word meanings, syntactic
categories, and argument-structure generalizations from input consisting of language and a
very simple semantic “scene” consisting of just a set of labels of items and events. Yu and
colloborators (Yu 2008; Yu and L. B. Smith 2007) have developed similar models, includ-
ing a model (Yu et al. 2005) that learns word meanings from raw auditory input combined
with eye-tracking data — that is, by correlating what is said with what is visually attended.1
These models obviously do not learn as much or as well as human children do. However,
such work represents a significant step in “seeing how much of linguistic structure can be
explained without postulating processes specific to language”.
Cross-modal association may also be seen as a form of classical (Pavlovian) condition-
ing (Pavlov 1927). One apparent difference is that in a relatively abstract domain such
as language there is no obvious analogue of the Pavlovian “unconditioned stimulus”. An
unconditioned stimulus is one which produces a particular response “automatically” by tap-
ping into some unconditioned (more basic or innate) response; the classic example of an
unconditioned stimulus is the food which caused Pavlov’s dogs to salivate, and in this case
the unconditioned response is apparently physiological. In contrast, a linguistic stimulus
such as a particular word induces no consistent unconditioned response, so it is not obvious
how even a sequence of linked conditioning associations (that is, higher-order conditioning)
could explain language-relevant associations.
Nonetheless, there is research applying classical conditioning theory to cognition in
comparably abstract domains, such as the study of how people formulate causal inferences
(Jara et al. 2006; Perales et al. 2004). More generally, Rescorla (1988: 152) argues that
Pavlovian conditioning is a rich learning mechanism, far more powerful than suggested by
the typical layman’s view, in which conditioning is limited to simple transference of reflexive
responses from one stimulus to another:
1The model of Yu et al. (2005) does involve some language-specific training in that it uses a phoneme
identifier to transform the raw audio speech stream into a sequence of phonemes. However, there is no
language-specific input at the level of the learned associations. The model segments sounds with a language-
specific mechanism, but then learns sound-meaning associations without any language-specific constraints
on how to find sound-meaning associations.
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Much modern thinking about conditioning instead derives largely from the
associative tradition originating in philosophy. It sees conditioning as the learn-
ing that results from exposure to relations among events in the environment.
Of course, “relations among events in the environment” are exactly what the linguistic
system is supposed to be sensitive to according to the UBTL. Rescorla also draws links
between Pavlovian conditioning and connectionist models of psychology — exactly the
types of models advocated by exemplar theorists (Bybee andMcClelland 2005; McClelland
and Bybee 2007).
Questions about cross-modal mapping still remain. The Law of Contiguity is an ex-
tremely general principle which potentially allows any sort of association to be learned.
Modern work on associative learning is more sophisticated (see, e.g. L. B. Smith 2000),
but the full ramifications of that sophistication are not as yet handled by the UBTL. In
particular, L. B. Smith (2000: 171) notes the importance of blocking, which is the fact
that “if one has already learned a cue that reliably predicts an outcome, it is harder to learn
a new cue that predicts the same outcome”. According to Smith, blocking means that “asso-
ciative learning based on the regularities in one’s previous experience alters what regularities
will be learned in the future”.
On the simplest level, this raises questions about how associative mechanisms can pro-
duce mutually intelligble grammars given that children do not all experience the same stim-
uli in the same sequence. Perhaps their experiences are “similar enough” — but if so, that
requires substantial work to document how similar children’s overall experiences are (not
just their linguistic input!).
However, of greater concern for the purposes of this dissertation is the question of how
association works in the web of multiply contingent predictors that make up the linguis-
tic system. The associations between individual words and their meanings are among the
simplest in the scheme of linguistic associations. Can cross-modal association really allow
people to learn, for instance, the various semantic and pragmatic factors conditioning use
of the passive voice, the transitive construction, etc.? If so, how do people avoid “blocking”
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later conditioning factors with the first one? For instance, Hopper and Thompson (1980)
identify ten different features cross-linguistically associated with the notion of transitiv-
ity, and argue that each of these features contributes to how or whether an event will be
expressed transitively, with the relative strengths of the contributions varying from one
language to another. How is that none of these associations blocks the others? And if
blocking does not apply in language as it does in other sorts of associative learning, then do
speakers’ mental representations of their languages become cluttered with associations that
are reliable but not useful for communication? If so, why have there been so few demon-
strations of direct associative links between linguistic and nonlinguistic regularities? If not,
why not? Or, if cross-modal association is not at work here, then what is the process by
which people learn the meanings and pragmatic connotations of syntactic constructions or
other grammatical structures?
Some researchers within linguistics have investigated the related phenomena of “sta-
tistical preemption” and “negative entrenchment” (Boyd and Goldberg 2011; Goldberg
2011; Stefanowitsch 2008), in which “speakers learn not to use a formulation if an alter-
native formulation with the same function is consistently witnessed” (Boyd and Goldberg
2011: 55). These studies show that language users are sensitive to contexts where a given
structure would be expected to occur (based on available evidence from their experience
so far), but in fact does not, and that they treat this kind of nonoccurrence as evidence
that the structure is dispreferred or ungrammatical in that context. However, these stud-
ies have focused only on language-internal negative entrenchment — that is, where there
is particular pattern of cooccurrences among linguistic forms. It is an open question how
or whether negative entrenchment extends to extralinguistic associations of the sort that
would be mediated by cross-modal association. Moreover, changes in language usage can
apparently occur in adulthood even when we might expect the new usage to be blocked via
negative entrenchment2, so even within the language domain there remains doubt about
2For instance, Bybee (2010: 118) points out the recent spread of you guys as a second-person plural
pronoun, even among adults, who presumably have spent much of their lives hearing and using you or y’all in
positions where you guys could have occurred but did not.
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what associations might or might not block others.
L. B. Smith (2000: 170) also argues that “we learn what we attend to,” and Ellis (2001:
42) suggests that “attentional focus in WM [working memory] can result in the formation
of cross-modal associations.” This complicates the picture for a thoroughgoing cross-modal-
association-based theory of language, since it requires an explanation of what it means
for language users to “attend to” semantic categories which are commonly encoded by
the world’s languages but which are abstract — such as transitivity, modality, or aspect —
as well as a demonstration that language users actually do attend to those dimensions of
experience.
An additional question is which aspects of experience are available to be cross-modally
associated with linguistic structure. In numerous writings, Bybee and other UBLT adher-
ents have suggested that the nonlinguistic contexts of utterances are of relevance to pattern
extraction. Bybee and Hopper (2001: 9) say that “tokens of experience with language are
organized into exemplars on the basis of high similarity of phonetic shape and function or
meaning, and such exemplars are tagged for their contextual associations, both linguistic
and extra-linguistic.” Likewise Bybee (2010: 74) says: “Since constructions relate meaning
to form, all syntactic relations in a construction grammar in contrast have semantic import
and are grounded in the linguistic and extralinguistic contexts in which they have been
used.” Despite this, there has been little discussion in linguistics of how exactly the lan-
guage is matched up with the nonlinguistic context. As Ibbotson (2013) points out, we still
need “a mechanistic account of the dimensions over which children and adults make (and
do not make) analogies.” In the absence of such an account, and of any explicit constraints,
the implication seems to be that any nonlinguistic contextual element that reliably cooccurs
with a linguistic form is available to be bound with that form into a linguistic form-meaning
pairing.
Thus, there is substantial evidence that cross-modal association does occur, but ques-
tions remain about howmuch it can occur and whether it occurs more or less than we would
expect. The abstract notion of cross-modal association as described by Bybee (2010, pas-
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sim) and Ellis (2001), and as leveraged in the acquisition and modeling studies cited above,
could in principle allow for far more associations than our languages seem to actually make
use of. One possible explanation for this is that such associations cannot be formed be-
cause “useless” patterns of cooccurrence between language and nonlanguage simply do not
exist. That would certainly be an interesting fact, but as mentioned above, it would require
linguists to take a detailed look at the nonlinguistic world in its own right, to see what
regularities it offers.
Another possibility is that such regularities do exist, but are filtered out by language-
specific processes. It may be that, although the Law of Contiguity allows us to learn any
relationship, language is more than just the Law of Contiguity, and restricts us to learn-
ing only some relationships. This is certainly a plausible view. On the most general level,
pragmatic factors (e.g., Grice’s cooperative principle) are likely to prejudice us in favor of
certain cues over others. Tomasello (Tomasello 2009) and others have argued that the ori-
gin of language lies in such factors. However, if this is the case, then part of the task of
developing the UBTL is documenting those prejudices in detail. Importantly, it is not suf-
ficient to show that they are preferentially encoded in language. If the form-meaning pairs
that make up a language are supposed to arise from cross-modal association, it would be
tautological to say that language users preferentially associate the sorts of cross-modal regu-
larities that language prefers. Rather, it must be shown that the nonlinguistic component
of the cross-modal association is preferentially perceived or attended in and of itself.3
As mentioned above, these possibilities are not inherently inconsistent with the UBTL,
because theUBTL does not require domain-generality. The point of this discussion is simply
to show that, although we know cross-modal association does happen, we are still some way
from knowing how wide its reach is — that is, what kinds of associations can actually be
incorporated into the linguistic system — and exactly how or whether these associations
3Of course, it would also be possible to propose that the associative faculty itself is language-specific —
that is, that we not only attend preferentially to certain cues, but preferentially encode, rehearse, or otherwise
retain certain kinds of cue-target pairs. However, to do so requires an even further weakening of the notion
that the cross-modal association is domain-general. An associative mechanism that is specially designed to
recognize certain types of associations for the language domain is as much a linguistic mechanism as an
associative one.
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can successfully build up the complete web of structure and meaning that constitutes a
grammar.
Chunking
According to Bybee (Bybee 2010: 7; see also Bybee 2002; Ellis 1996; Haiman 1994; Miller
1956), “chunking is the process by which sequences of units that are used together cohere
to form more complex units.” Newell (1990: 7) calls chunking “a ubiquitous feature of
human memory.”
In the context of linguistics, chunking (although not always called by that name) has
been cited as an explanation for the gradual conventionalization of groups of words into
syntactic constructions (Boyland 1996; Bybee and Thompson 2000; Krug 1998), the pho-
netic reduction of common sequences of words (Bybee and Scheibman 1999; Hay and
Bresnan 2006; Jurafsky et al. 2001) and the grammaticalization of words into morphemes
(Bybee 2007; Bybee et al. 1994; Hopper and Traugott 2003). In each case, the chunk
develops “autonomy” — that is, it begins to have properties of its own, above and beyond
those of its parts (see Bybee 2010, Chap. 3 for discussion of the causes and effects of
autonomy).
Evidence that chunking is a domain-general process can be found in the area of artificial-
language studies. In these studies, participants are exposed to sequences of symbols that are
semantically meaningless but display regular statistical patterns. The participants are then
tested by exposing them to new sequences that either do or do not display the same statis-
tical regularities, and seeing if they can distinguish between the two kinds of sequences. It
has been shown that infants4 (e.g. Aslin et al. 1998; Saffran et al. 1999) as well as adults
(e.g. Saffran et al. 1999) are able, at above-chance levels, to distinguish sequences that
display the regularities from sequences that do not, with only a few minutes of exposure.
Notably, the ability to group regularly cooccurring units is not modality-specific: the statis-
4The infant studies use typical methodologies for testing infants’ discriminative abilities, such as head-
turning paradigms.
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tical regularities can be learned whether the symbols in the sequence are auditory or visual
(Saffran 2002).
In the framework of Bybee (2010), this chunking ability is identified as a separate abil-
ity from cross-modal association. The main difference that seems to be recognized (e.g.
Bybee 2010; Ellis 2001) is that chunking involves the creation of larger units from coocur-
rence regularities within a single sequence of smaller units, whereas cross-modal association
involves the recognition of a cooccurrence regularity between two separate sequences (e.g.,
language and visual input). In other words, chunking apparently involves combining units
of “the same kind” into one, whereas cross-modal association creates a new unit from two
units of different kinds.
However, in principle it is possible that the two are really the same: that is, perhaps
cross-modal association is simply cross-modal chunking. To date, no artificial language
studies have tested whether these sorts of sequential regularities can be learned when the
artificial language is itself cross-modal — the artificial language has always been auditory or
visual, but not both. Nonetheless, if cross-modal association and within-modality chunking
are both globally available processes for recognizing and processing stimuli, as suggested by
Bybee (2010, Chaps. 1 and 3), then there is no reason that people should not be able to
learn regularities that cross domain boundaries. In a similar vein, Ellis (2001: 44) argues
that links between various kinds of mental representations underlie many if not all levels
of linguistic structure:
Links with conceptual representations underlie reference and grounded seman-
tics. Links with frequent local collocations underlie syntax and idiomatic mean-
ing. Links with local andmore distant lexical neighbours underlie lexical seman-
tics. Links between L2 and simultaneously active Ll representations underlie
translation and language transfer effects.
Here “links” are central, whether they are with other linguistic elements or with nonlin-
guistic elements.
14
In short, if we can recognize coocurrence patterns within and across domains by means
of a general chunking mechanism, we should be able to learn patterns in just the same way
regardless of whether they cross domain boundaries or not. This is a crucial consequence
of the acceptance of both cross-modal association and chunking as fully general cognitive
processes, but its significance for the UBTL does not seem to have been recognized within
linguistics. What it means is that, in principle, the current UBTL explanation for how
people learn linguistic structure actually amounts to a description of how people might
learn any structure — that is, any statistically reliable pattern encountered in the world.
1.1.2 Memory
Memory plays an important role in the UBTL. In Bybee’s (2010: 14) treatment, the central
building blocks are exemplar representations, which “are rich memory representations; they
contain, at least potentially, all the information a language user can perceive in a linguistic
experience.” Bybee (2010: 18) argues that individual tokens of experience must be stored,
because “there is no way for frequency to matter unless even the first occurrence of an item
is noted in memory.” By “frequency mattering” Bybee refers to the other domain-general
processes, such as chunking and cross-modal association, which are claimed to operate on
the rich memory representations, and to be sensitive to the frequency with which particular
units cooccur.
Importantly, in Bybee’s characterization, the exemplar includes “the meaning, infer-
ences made from this meaning and from the context, and properties of the social, physical
and linguistic context” (Bybee 2010: 14) — that is, nonlinguistic aspects of experience are
stored along with linguistic elements (see also Beckner et al. 2009). This information pre-
sumably needs to be available in order for cross-modal association to occur, as discussed
above. Although the UBLT thus requires a domain-general memory store for processing
to operate on, there is little discussion of the nature of this memory store as it relates to
nonlinguistic information. There is considerable evidence that phonological/phonetic de-
tail is stored (e.g. Bybee 2001; Hay and Bresnan 2006; Pierrehumbert 2001), and there is
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also evidence for memory effects on other linguistic levels (such as syntax, e.g. Bybee 2007;
Bybee and Thompson 2000), but the nonlinguistic component of the putative exemplars
is rarely mentioned.
Work in the UBTL tradition sometimes blurs the distinction between memory and fre-
quency of use. The idea seems to be that memory is the means by which frequency can
exert an effect on mental representations. However, although frequency is typically com-
puted for a particular exemplar that is determined to already exist in the system, Bybee’s
argument would also imply that the rich-memory store must retain all detail even in order
to create a new exemplar whose frequency can be subsequently computed.
For instance, Bybee (2010: 19) says that “each of the phonetic forms of a word that
are distinguishable are established in memory as exemplars”. Likewise in Pierrhumbert’s
(2001: 141) exemplar model of phonology, “the JND (just noticeable difference) for f0 in
any given part of the range is determined by the resolution of the anatomical and neural
mechanisms which are involved in encoding f0. Thus, it is reasonable to suppose that
speech tokens differing by less than one JND in f0 are stored as if they had identical f0s.”
Clearly here the only detail that does not make it into the exemplar is that which cannot
be perceived in the first place. However, in discussing syntactic exemplars — specifically,
the emergence of in spite of as a syntactic constituent with its own properties that masks its
internal prepositional-phrase structure — Bybee (2010: 138) says that “repetition of the
phrase also sets it up as an exemplar in its own right (because it is a chunk)”. By Bybee’s
argument, repetition of the phrase cannot matter unless each repetition was already stored
in memory before it was set up as an exemplar in its own right; the system would never
know when to create a new exemplar unless it kept memories of previous experiences and
compared them to determine whether any were similar enough to warrant the creation of
a new node in the “network of associations” (Bybee 2010: 22).
Again, there are some possible ways out of this conundrum. One is to say that the
storage of all phonetic detail takes place or is relevant only for phonological exemplars, and
that the exemplar system for syntax works differently, with its network of associations being
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determined by some other mechanism. As will be discussed in a later section, however,
positing separate processes for different levels of structure in this way is at odds with other
tenets of the UBTL. At the least, the discussion and use of similar network diagrams in
(Bybee 2010, 22ff.), however, clearly suggest that the same associative network is meant to
be active for all levels of linguistic structure. Moreover, the validity of the exemplar model
as a domain-general explanation for language structure is seriously weakened if it does not
even generalize to different levels of structure within language.
A second option would be to distinguish chunking as a separate cognitive operation
which does not rely on memory per se in the same way that exemplar categorization does.
However, if this option is taken, it is unclear why the additional memory-reliant exemplar
model is needed at all. If chunking can already identify a sequence of words such as in spite
of, in spite of the phonetic variation across multiple encounters with that phrase, then why
can it not also do the work of exemplar phonology by gathering multiple phonetic tokens
into a chunk representing a phoneme? In an earlier section I suggested that the UBTL
presently does not clearly distinguish chunking from cross-modal association; here we see
that it does not clearly distinguish chunking from memory-reliant exemplar categorization
either.
This is not to say that the model is therefore incorrect. It is clear that, even if some the-
oretical work is duplicated by chunking, cross-modal association, and rich memory storage,
it is because they are all working in the direction of the overall claim of the UBTL: that
language structure is emergent from experience. My point is, again, simply to say that the
generality of the proposed mechanisms is a two-edged sword; the mechanisms are powerful,
but they can be so powerful that it is not clear why one or two of them alone cannot do all
the explanatory work. The solution is not necessarily to cut back the theory in the name
of parsimony; rather, as this dissertation will argue, empirical results may suggest that the
theory needs more specifics, not more generality.
One reason that the additional utility of the rich-memory-based exemplar system is
unclear is that the nature of the memory system itself is not made explicit. It is somewhat
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puzzling that work within linguistics has relied on the concept of memory while drawing
little connection to the vast psychological literature on memory.
On the most general level, it is appropriate to ask, if the UBTL talks about memory,
what kind ofmemory is it talking about? Within psychology, Squire’s (1987) categorization
of types of memory has been influential. Squire distinguishes short-term memory (which
roughly corresponds to what is now more commonly called “working memory”) from long-
term memory. The latter is divided into procedural memory — “memory that is contained
within learned skills or modifiable cognitive operations” — and declarative memory —
“memory that is directly accessible to conscious recollection” (Squire 1987: 152) — with
declarative memory itself divided into episodic memory — “memory for past events in an
individual’s life” — and semantic memory — “knowledge of the world ... [which] does not
refer to particular events in a person’s past” (Squire 1987: 169). More recently “declarative
memory” has sometimes been referred to as “explicit memory”, and Squire’s procedural
memory has been grouped into a complementary category of “implicit memory” which also
includes perceptual priming, classical conditioning, and other nonconscious mechanisms.
This framework has evolved over time (see, e.g. Schacter and Tulving 1994; Squire 2004;
Squire and Zola 1996) and alternatives have been proposed (see, e.g. Henke 2010), but
the basic distinctions remain valuable.
Where does the sort of memory posited by the UBLT fall in such a scheme? Although
Ellis (2001) has discussed the relevance of working memory for the actual online execution
of cross-modal association and chunking, it is clear that most discussions of “rich-memory
representations” as used in exemplar models are referring to some sort of long-term stor-
age. On the one hand, phrases such as “specific experiences with language” (Bybee 2010:
53) suggest an analogy with episodic memory. Port (2010: 44) even explicitly suggests
“a rich memory for speech material, resembling episodic memory for everyday events and
activities”. On the other hand, it is equally clear that this rich-memory store is not ex-
plicit: people obviously cannot call to consciousness every situation in which they heard a
particular word, and in many cases they might be unable to recall any specific instances.
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Ullman (2001) has proposed a Declarative/Procedural model in which declarative mem-
ory underlies lexical knowledge while procedural memory underlies grammatical knowl-
edge; however, separating words from rules in this way is a clear break with the UBTL,
which (as has been mentioned but will be discussed more fully later) rejects the notion of
such boundaries in favor of gradience between lexical and grammatical facets of language.5
Kidd and Kirjavainen (Kidd and Kirjavainen 2011; see also Lum and Kidd 2012) contrast
this model with a “single-route approach” which is essentially in the vein of the UBTL.
However, they argue that
since the single-route model argues for a prominent role for vocabulary acqui-
sition in the development of morphological knowledge, and since vocabulary
knowledge is essentially declarative knowledge, a single-route model that in-
corporates long-term memory processes would identify a prominent role for
the declarative system.
Although this apparently posits declarative memory as the type hypothesized by the UBTL,
this cannot really be the sort of “rich-memory store” that forms the basis of exemplar mod-
els. What is declarative about vocabulary knowledge is precisely the abstracted “output”
of the exemplar system, and what is nondeclarative is precisely the detailed token-by-token
records which are claimed not to be thrown away. In other words, although the exemplar
model produces declarative knowledge (i.e., we can say what a wordmeans), its internal work-
ings cannot be based on declarative knowledge (i.e., we cannot say what specific instances
of language use resulted in us knowing what that word means).6
Reaching beyond language-related work on memory, some characterizations of the func-
tions of implicit memory show a conceptual link with the pattern-recognition operations
posited by the UBTL. Squire and Zola (1996: 13515) discuss neuropsychological evidence
5For instance, Croft (2001) states that “there is a continuum between the lexcion and syntactic construc-
tions” (emphasis in the original. For useful perspective on this issue, see for instance 2005, 2007, and 2007.)
6Nonetheless, Kidd and collaborators (Kidd and Kirjavainen 2011; Lum and Kidd 2012) found evidence
that declarative memory was correlated with morphological acquisition in English and Finnish, suggesting
that this memory system does play some role.
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that implicit memory (which they call nondeclarative memory) is essential for “probabilis-
tic classification learning” in which
subjects attempt to learn a set of associations. The associations are not obvious,
and they are difficult to memorize because of the probabilistic structure of the
task. As a result, information from a single trial is not as reliable or useful as
information accrued across many trials.
This obviously has much in common with the sort of pattern extraction that is claimed to
underlie language in the UBTL. Squire and Zola also note that “artificial grammar learning
is nondeclarative”, as are “category learning and prototype extraction”; again, these are the
types of processes that UBTL proponents say are at the root of linguistic knowledge.
Here I will briefly draw attention to one particular phenomenon within language which
some have argued is a form of implicit learning, namely structural priming. A fuller discus-
sion of structual priming will be given later. For the moment, suffice it to say that it is a
phenomenon in which use of some particular language structure — for instance, the English
passive voice or double-object construction — facilitates future processing or production of
that structure. A number of researchers (e.g. Bock and Griffin 2000; Chang et al. 2000;
Savage et al. 2006) have suggested that this phenomenon is the result of implicit learning.
Structural priming is the specific phenomenon investigated in this dissertation, as will be
described in later sections.
On the whole, it seems most plausible that, if the UBTL is on the right track, the
memory system involved in linguistic congition is some sort of implicit memory. However,
UBTL practicitioners (e.g. Bybee 2010; Port 2010) have tended to emphasize the “richness”
of the memory store and its storage of “experiences”; this terminology misleadingly suggests
a more episodic store.
Some of this confusion may be merely due to a terminological issue which sometimes
arises in distinguishing the different types of memory. Even in the psychological literature
there is sometimes a blurring of the distinction between the directness or indirectness of the
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task and the explicitness or implicitness of the memory system that is accessed. S. M. Smith
et al. (1990: 230) thus give us the apparently oxymoronic statement that “implicit mem-
ory tests reveal episodic memory” — but they then go on to note that the term “indirect
measure” unambiguously refers to the task and not to the memory system.
With regard to memory as it figures in the UBTL, it might be useful to follow the
terminological approach used by, for instance, Squire and Zola (1996), in which terms for
the overall learning effect are mixed with terms for the memory systems. Thus, although
their article is about memory systems, Squire and Zola (as quoted above) nonetheless say
that artificial grammar learning is nondeclarative. Most UBTL work on the question to
date seemingly implies that the storage of experiences is one thing, and the extraction of the
regularities is a separate processing step; but in Squire and Zola’s framing, the registering of
the regularities is the implicit memory — there is no need to deal with the specific memory
traces of each learning trial, and thus no need to become entangled in the details about
exactly which features of an individual episode are stored and which are not.
It is tautological that every form of memory is “episodic” in the sense that some partic-
ular events in the past resulted in the creation of the memory trace. However, this does not
necessarily mean that every aspect of those events is part of the memory trace. Likewise, it
must of course be true that each linguistic token encountered has an effect on the mental
representation, but the mechanism of this may be considered internal to the memory sys-
tem and need not be specified in a discussion of how that memory system subserves a larger
cognitive task (e.g., language). To claim that the language system relies on the “richness”
of these individual tokens needlessly exposes the UBTL to questions about how or if the
individual tokens can be accessed, when in fact all that is needed is the overall result that
the regularities are learned.
Setting aside such issues of presentation, the more significant fact is that UBTL work
within linguistics has played somewhat fast and loose with the term “memory”. The claim
is that various details of experience are stored. However, without grounding such a claim
by reference to existing knowledge of memory systems, it is unclear exactly what is being
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claimed (i.e., whether the knowledge is implicit, explicit, or both) and how or whether the
storage of these details is distinct from the process of extracting regularities from them.
As before, this lack of specificity in the theory does not mean it is wrong, but it means
its boundaries are currently not well defined. It is, for instance, not clear exactly what
sorts of information, and what sorts of regularities in that information, really can be in-
corporated into the linguistic system. Saying that exemplar representations “contain, at
least potentially, all the information a language user can perceive in a linguistic experience”
(Bybee 2010: 14) is an extremely broad claim, because people can obviously perceive all
sorts of things. The word “potentially” does not make the claim any less broad, but simply
hedges it and opens the door for future research to provide a demonstration that a given
kind of information is or is not available. In particular, allowing the possibility that lin-
guistic exemplars can contain unconstratined nonlinguistic context opens the floodgates to
a multitude of hypotheses about what elements of the nonlinguistic context are or can be
relevant, and, under the ground rules of the UBTL, each such hypothesis — that is, each
kind of nonlinguistic context — must be evaluated empirically.
1.1.3 Rejection of discrete levels of structure
A third core position of the UBTL is its rejection of the idea that different levels of linguistic
structure are governed by separate processes. Rather, in most recent UBTL work, all levels
of linguistic structure are taken to be represented by “constructions”; the term derives from
construction grammar (see e.g. Fillmore et al. 1988; Goldberg 1995), but the concept has
been generalized beyond the syntactic constructions that originally motivated that line of
research. Bybee (2010: 56) argues that “chunking and the gradual increase in autonomy
has effects at all levels of grammar”, and Bybee and Beckner (2009) say that “all of the
units of language—segments, phonemes, morphemes, words, phrases, constituents—can
be arrived at by the simple categorization process described above [the exemplar model]”.
Likewise Beckner et al. (2009: 5):
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The basic units of grammar are constructions, which are direct form-meaning
pairings that range from the very specific (words or idioms) to the more gen-
eral (passive construction, ditransitive construction), and from very small units
(words with affixes, walked) to clause-level or even discourse-level units
Croft (2001: 17) makes the point even more explicit:
The constructional tail has come to wag the syntactic dog: everything from
words to the most general syntactic and semantic rules can be represented as
constructions. The final step is to recognize that the internal structure of words
are also constructions. [...] The only difference between morphological con-
structions and syntactic ones is that the former are entirely made up of bound
morphemes while the latter are largely made up of free morphemes.
In other words, construction grammar has generalized the notion of a con-
struction to apply to any grammatical structure, including both its form and its
meaning. The logical consequence of accommodating idioms in syntactic the-
ory has been to provide a uniform representation of all types of grammatical
structures from words to syntactic and semantic rules.
And Bybee and McClelland (2005: 397-398) go so far as to state their position in the most
uncompromising italics (emphasis in the original):
there is no analysis into units at any level or set of levels that will ever successfully and
completely capture the realities of synchronic structure or provide a framework in which to
capture language change.
Needless to say, these are bold statements. They are bold not only because they chal-
lenge decades of linguistic tradition, but because they do away with a possible defense
mechanism for the theory they advocate (the UBTL). Namely, once it is accepted that
there are no a priori distinctions between levels of linguistic structure, it is no longer pos-
sible to counter any adverse empirical finding by claiming that the rules are different for
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that particular sort of linguistic structure. Chunking, cross-modal association, memory
(in whatever form) and all the rest of the domain-general apparatus are, according to the
UBTL, fully available to operate on anything. In addition, as I have argued at intervals in
the preceding sections, since these operations are domain-general and operate over all as-
pects of experience, they are available to operate on the nonlinguistic correlates of linguistic
structure as well as on the linguistic structure itself.
This does not of course mean that any such adverse finding is a death blow to the
UBTL, or even a serious wound. To say that there are no a priori distinctions between levels
of structure is not to say that there are never emergent levels with gradient boundaries
but with distinct properties. The point is that any appeal to such levels must always be
grounded in specific empirical data that justify the identification of that level as a level.
For instance, if it is found that a certain syntactic process does not operate as predicted,
there can be no counterclaim that such processes only operate at the level of the lexicon,
and not the level of syntax, because in the UBTL there is no such distinction as such; there
can still be a counterclaim that in the language(s) investigated, it has been empirically
shown that some processes are different than others, and that processes like the one under
discussion are different in that they have been empirically shown to operate only on units of
a certain size, and that the units under investigation were too big (or too small). Obviously,
the available counterclaim is more labor-intensive than the one of which the UBTL has
disarmed itself.
This disarmament is both an advantage and a disadvantage. It is an advantage in that
it strengthens the theory from a logical perspective: an argument with fewer hypotheses
yields more informative conclusions. It is a disadvantage in that it exposes the theory to
a much broader range of potential attacks than would otherwise be feasible. Perhaps even
this disadvantage can be seen as an advantage, if it leads to a more vigorous and rapid
fleshing out of the UBTL.
For present purposes, I point out the level-agnosticism of the UBTL simply to make it
clear that the arguments made in the preceding sections are, in the absence of other evi-
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dence, prima facie valid for any level of linguistic structure. If cross-modal association can
create form-meaning links between words and situations in the world, then it can also cre-
ate such links between syntax and situations in the world. If chunking can group regularly
cooccurring items together, then it can group regularly cooccuring things together at any
level of linguistic structure. And, perhaps most importantly, if rich-memory representa-
tions contain nonlinguistic contextual information, then we must assume that any level of
linguistic structure is potentially contingent on the nonlinguistic context.
1.1.4 Change throughout the lifespan
An additional point made by Bybee (2010: 9) is that “change is postulated to occur as
language is used rather than in the acquisition process”. Although this position is not made
explicit in much UBTL work, Bybee (2010: 114) notes that it is essentially inherent in the
usage-based position: “if usage is the basis of grammar and change in the grammar, then
there is no a priori reason why change cannot occur over an adult’s lifetime.” Moreover, the
claim is borne out somewhat by some of the demonstrations of domain-general processes
discussed in previous sections. Studies have shown that adults can learn artificial-languages
(e.g. Saffran et al. 1999) and anomalous constructions within an existing language (Boyd
et al. 2009), suggesting that there is scope for continued learning through the lifespan.
As mentioned earlier, structural priming has also been thought of as a form of implicit
learning, and has been readily demonstrated with adult subjects. Ellis (2001, 2013) has
also extended usage-based associative-learning approaches to second-language acquisition.
Of course, it is obvious that adults do not learn as much or as rapidly as children do.
A natural explanation for this within the UBTL is that, if mental representations arise
from experience, children’s mental representations would naturally be muchmore malleable
because they have less experience. Any individual experience that might be registered would
carry greater weight for a child, whereas for an adult each experience couldmore easily blend
in with the large store of already-accumulated experiences.
Thus, like the other tenets of the UBTL already discussed, the exact details of this
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explanation remain to be filled in. Clearly, some change in linguistic representations can be
effected in adults; equally clearly, adults’ representations are less malleable than children’s
(see Bybee 2010: 118); the theory does not provide an overall explanation for just what
degrees of malleability should be found for which kinds of representations at which points
in the lifespan.
1.1.5 Summary of components of the UBTL
To briefly recap: in broad terms, the UBTL proposes that mental representations of lin-
guistic structure arise from the operation of domain-general processes — such as chunking
and cross-modal association — on memory representations that potentially include all as-
pects (linguistic and nonlinguistic) of each situation in which a linguistic item or structure
was used or encountered. The UBTL also proposes that these shaping factors are the same
for all levels of linguistic structure, and that the representations they create are subject to
modification throughout adult life.
There is evidence for each component of this overall theory. However, the posited
processes are extremely general in nature, and the extant work, although demonstrating
instances of their operation, leave considerable uncertainty about just how broad they may
be and precisely how they are supposed to operate in any given situation. When mecha-
nisms of such generality are posited, it is difficult to predict all the possible ways in which
they might conceivably interact. In addition, the rejection of a priori distinctions between
levels of structure, and of first-language acquisition as the sole locus of change, enlarges
even more the field in which these processes are at play.
Recently, Ibbotson (2013) has discussed many of the same issues in a similar review of
the UBTL (which he calls “the usage-based approach”). Ibbotson points out that “being
able to accommodate a large range of cross-linguistic findings means that stipulating in any
detail, a priori, which processing constraints and input properties are most important, and
when, is very difficult” and that “usage-based theories need more psychologically plausible
models of what gets treated as a chunk when, and hence ’counted’ in any distributional
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analysis”. For the UBTL, “a key part of responding to this challenge will be to specify in
greater detail the mechanisms of generalization”. I echo those concerns here.
In addition, I echo the sentiment of Bybee and McClelland (2005: 382) that we should
sometimes “ask not what linguistics can do for psychology, but what psychology can do for
linguistics.” If the processes underlying language are truly domain-general, then we should
be able to “import” knowledge about how those processes work in other domains to make
direct predictions about language. The need for this is particularly evident when it comes to
the role of memory in the UBTL. Memory is a fundamental psychological notion that has
been studied experimentally for over a hundred years. In light of that, it is quite surprising
that the exemplar models put forth by Bybee (2001, 2010), Pierrehumbert (2001) and
others make no attempt to link their concept of memory with any of that research. Various
processes and properties of memory have been deeply investigated within psychology, and
if the UBTL really deals with memory qua memory, it should be accountable to what is
known about memory.
Finally, I wish to emphasize again the nebulous role of nonlinguistic information within
the UBTL. The memories are supposed to contain the nonlinguistic context of each lin-
guistic token; the pattern-recognition processes are supposed to be domain-general; and
yet there is so far no detailed account of how the exemplar model integrates nonlinguis-
tic experience with linguistic experience. In short, if the UBTL is on the right track, then
why does our system of linguistic patterns seem so minimally mixed with the various other
patterns that we learn? Why is it that our patterns of usage of syntactic constructions are
so closely intertwined with our patterns of usage of particular verbs, and yet so little inter-
twined with our patterns of eating, sleeping, paying the electric bill, blinking, breathing, or
any of the other regularly patterned aspects of our lives? Or is it possible that such patterns
do exist, but that we are not aware of them, just as we were not, until recently, aware of the
subtle language-internal usage patterns which motivated the UBTL?
It is important to recognize that the inclusion of nonlinguistic information in stored
exemplars is not an incidental claim that could be withdrawn while leaving the rest of the
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UBTL intact. Without inferencing from the nonlinguistic context, the UBTL provides no
way for people to learn even single word meanings, let alone apply the complex pragmatic
inferencing that is said to underlie language change (e.g. Bybee 2010; Bybee et al. 1994;
Hopper and Traugott 2003). It is thus essential that some nonlinguistic information be
stored; the UBTL simply leaves it open to empirical investigation to determine how much
and of what kinds. As will be seen, the central work of this dissertation was to test various
kinds of nonlinguistic information to see whether they are so stored.
The point is that if the cognitive basis of the UBTL is truly domain-general, we should
not just be able to show that we learn linguistic patterns just like we learn other patterns;
we should be able to show that we learn patterns, period, whether they consist of language,
nonlanguage, or both. The UBTL does not explicitly predict that we should learn such
patterns, but in its current state, with its limited specification of how its components in-
teroperate, it implicitly does so predict. A finding that such patterns are learned would be
a powerful demonstration of the true domain-generality of the UBTL; a finding that such
patterns are not learned would be a useful empirical result about the limits of the sorts of
information that can be combined by the pattern-recognition system.
1.2 Structural priming
Having outlined the general perspective of the UBTL, I wish to examine inmore detail a par-
ticular phenomenon, namely structural priming. Structural priming is a form of the more
general phenomenon of priming, in which exposure to a stimulus (the prime) facilitates
subsequent processing of a related stimulus (the target).7 Priming has been demonstrated
7A potential terminological stumbling block must be dealt with here. In the psychological literature, there
is a distinction between perceptual priming and semantic (or conceptual) priming (see e.g. Tulving and Schac-
ter 1990). All of the kinds of priming discussed in this dissertation fall under the label of semantic priming.
Within psychology, the word “semantic” essentially refers to knowledge, and hence “semantic priming” refers
to conceptual priming — that is, all priming that is influenced by concepts above the immediate perceptual
level (see e.g. Ochsner et al. 1994). However, within linguistics, the term “semantic” has a narrower sense,
referring specifically to linguistic meaning, in contrast to various other levels of linguistic structure; thus
“semantic priming” refers specifically to a kind of priming in which prime and target bear some relation in
meaning, rather than a relation in linguistic form. Therefore structural priming, in which the primed element
is a syntactic construction, is semantic priming in the psychological sense but not in the linguistic sense,
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for linguistic stimuli that are related semantically (e.g. Meyer and Schvaneveldt 1971),
morphologically (e.g. Marslen-Wilson et al. 1994), and phonologically (e.g. Carreiras et al.
2005).
In structural priming, the relation between the prime and the target is one of linguistic
structure. Structural priming has typically focused on syntactic relations, although the
term “structural priming” allows for other sorts of structural relations (see Pickering and
Ferreira 2008). Bock (1986)’s early demonstration of syntactic priming has been influential
(although a few earlier studies had addressed the phenomenon, e.g. Estival 1985; Schenkein
1980; Weiner and Labov 1983). In Bock’s study, which was done on English, participants
heard sentences read aloud and periodically had to describe pictures. The pictures were
designed to be describable in either active or passive voice. Before each picture-description
task, participants heard a sentence in either active or passive voice. It was found that
participants were more likely than chance to describe a picture using the same voice they
had just heard; that is, hearing an active-voice sentence primed subjects to use active voice
themselves, and likewise for passive voice. The same effect was also observed for dative
constructions, in which either the double-object construction (e.g., Bob gave his friend a book)
or the prepositional dative (e.g., Bob gave a book to his friend) could be primed.
There have been numerous subsequent demonstrations of this effect (e.g. Bock 1989;
Bock and Loebell 1990; Bock et al. 1992). The priming effect has been shown to be active
in dialogue as well as picture description (Branigan et al. 2000; Gries 2005), and has been
replicated in Dutch (Hartsuiker and Kolk 1998) and German (Scheepers 2003). It has also
been shown for other syntactic constructions, including the order of subject and locative
(Hartsuiker et al. 1999), the order of verb and auxiliary (Hartsuiker andWestenberg 2000),
and the form of complex noun phrases (Cleland and Pickering 2003).
Pickering and Ferreira (2008), in addition to providing a useful review of structural
priming research, discuss theoretical implications of and competing explanations for the
because the crucial shared feature of prime and target is syntax rather than meaning. Because perceptual
priming is not germane here, I simply use the linguistic terminology; thus “priming” alone refers to what in
psychology would be “semantic priming”, and “semantic priming” has the narrow reading as in linguistics.
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phenomenon. Of particular note is the possibility that structural priming is a form of
implicit learning. Pickering and Ferreira give a clear description of this position (although
they do not endorse it):
The core idea is that for people to produce and comprehend language, theymust
learn how their different linguistic and language-related representations relate
or map onto one other. To produce or understand the word cat, a language user
must learn that the meaning of domestic feline maps onto the word cat (which
is a noun), which in turn maps onto the sound sequence /kæt/ and so forth.
Everyday language experience can drive the learning of this knowledge, if re-
trieval of the word cat along with its meaning causes the connection or mapping
between these representations to become strengthened. Though more abstract,
implicit learning of syntax is similar: To produce or understand a passive struc-
ture, a language user must learn that certain meaning relationships (typically, of
a patient having something done to it by an agent) map onto certain functional
elements (subject and oblique objects), which map onto critical features of con-
stituent sequences (how noun phrases and verb phrases are to be configured),
and so forth. These mappings are acquired through experience, such that if a
person produces or comprehends an utterance in which a particular meaning re-
lationship is expressed through a particular processing sequence corresponding
to constructing a passive or active structure, the mappings among the responsi-
ble representations should be strengthened, thereby allowing the same meaning
relationships to be expressed through the same processing sequences and so the
same syntactic features again. By this account, structural priming is a reflection
of this extended process: Hearing or producing the prime strengthens the pro-
cessing sequence that yielded the prime structure, and target processing reveals
this strengthened knowledge.
Pickering and Ferreira note several studies advocating this interpretation (e.g. Bock and
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Griffin 2000; Chang et al. 2000; Savage et al. 2006).
As suggested by the account above, structural priming is a natural fit for the UBTL. The
implicit-learning account of structural priming essentially claims that it is a result of just
the sort of pattern extraction posited by the UBTL.
Structural priming has the additional appeal that it can produce effects on actual lin-
guistic production. Experimental results that show performance on a non-production task
(such as the artificial-language and weird-word-order studies on adults cited earlier) have
an unclear status within the UBTL. Although the UBTL posits that a great deal of informa-
tion is stored and patterns extracted, it does not make clear predictions about how these
representations should affect comprehension versus production. If the theory is fundamen-
tally grounded in usage, which includes both comprehension and production, what are we
to make of results which show that people can be “taught” generalizations which they can
nonconsciously perceive (at least probabilistically, i.e., by picking the correct picture in a
forced-choice task) but will not actually use in speech? The problem is compounded when
the comprehension task is remote from realistic activities of language use (e.g., a forced-
choice task). Methodologies that demonstrate effects on language production are the most
powerful evidence, since a change in production patterns unequivocally shows that mental
representation of language has been affected on some level.
As will be described in due course, the empirical investigation of the dissertation was in
the form of a structural priming experiment. However, in order to test the role of nonlin-
guistic information in pattern recognition, the structural priming paradigm was combined
with paradigms from psychological work on context-dependent memory.
1.3 Context-dependent memory
Having mentioned the importance of memory within the UBTL, I wish to introduce one
memory phenomenon which has been well-studied in psychology and which bears con-
ceptual similarities to the “network model” of the UBTL. This phenomenon is context-
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dependent memory. Context-dependent memory is the phenomenon that “reinstatement
of the incidental environmental context in which learning took place has often been found
to improve memory relative to testing memory in a different context” (S. M. Smith et al.
1990; see also S. M. Smith 1994).
Typically, context-dependent memory effects are found by having subjects learn some
materials in one context, and then testing their memory for the materials in either the same
context or a different context; memory tested in the same context is enhanced relative to
testing in a different context. The “context” can apparently be virtually any aspect of the
environment; as S. M. Smith (1994: 169) reports, results have been found with contextual
differences such as “under water (with scuba gear) vs. on dry land (Godden and Baddeley
1975), with classical vs. jazz music playing in the background (S. M. Smith 1985), in a
sensory deprivation flotation tank vs. a lounge (S. M. Smith and Sinha 1987) and, most
commonly, in one laboratory room vs. another (e.g. S. M. Smith 1979; S. M. Smith et al.
1978, 1990)”. The effect is extensively documented, with work going back as far as Dulsky
(1935). S. M. Smith and Vela (2001: 215) conducted a meta-analysis of 75 studies from
41 published articles spanning more than 60 years and concluded: “In spite of some failed
attempts to find environmental context-dependent memory effects, it is clear from our
meta-analysis that across all reported studies, the effects are reliably found.”
Most context-dependent memory research has used verbal stimuli such as word lists as
the material to be remembered. However, some studies (Dalton 1993; Krafka and Penrod
1985; Malpass and Devine 1981; S. M. Smith and Vela 1992) have found similar effects
for remembering faces, so the effect does not appear to be specific to verbal material.
Context-dependent memory has a clear similarity to some of the mechanisms proposed
by the UBTL. In the pattern-rcognition system of the UBTL, it is easy to suppose that
contextual elements could form part of the recognized patterns. Moreover, the apparent
effect of reinstantiating the context shows that incidental information about the context
was “stored” in the way that incidental information about linguistic events (e.g., phonetic
detail that does not affect meaning) is supposed to be stored in exemplars according to
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the UBTL. In particular, the assertion that the UBTL makes use of “memory storage of
the details of experience with language, including [...] contexts of use” (Bybee 2010: 7) al-
most directly suggests that linguistic knowledge should display context-dependent memory
effects.
An important issue, again, is whether the context-dependent memories are implicit or
explicit — or, alternatively, whether they are revealed by a direct memory task or by influ-
encing performance on an indirect task. The vast majority of context-dependent memory
findings have used a direct memory test, such as recognition or cued recall. However, some
studies have found effects on implicit tasks. This is important because structural priming is
an implicit task: the test is not, for instance, whether the participants can remember having
seen passive voice, but whether their having seen passive voice implicitly makes them more
likely to use it themselves.
S. M. Smith et al. (1990) had participants memorize a list of word pairs, which included
low-frequency homophones of high-frequency words (e.g., subjects saw the word beet, which
is infrequent compared to the homophonic beat). Smith et al. then gave the participants a
direct memory task, which was in fact only a decoy task to make the participants believe
that their memory would not be further tested. Subsequently, participants left the room
and either returned to the same room or went to a different room (this was the context
manipulation), at which point they were asked to write down a series of words which they
heard spoken on a tape recording. The words spoken included some of the homophones
heard before (e.g, subjects heard [bit], which they could have transcribed as either beat or
beet). It was found that participants were more likely to use the low-frequency spelling
if they performed this task in the same room where they had initially studied the word
pairs. Smith et al. finally asked participants to explicitly indicate words they recognized
as having been on the original list. The successfuly primed low-frequency words were not
significantly more likely than their unprimed high-frequency homophones to be recognized;
that is, although participants used the low-frequency spellings in the transcription task,
they apparently did not consciously remember having seen the low-frequency spellings as
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opposed to their high-frequency counterparts. Smith et al. interpreted this as evidence that
the implicit priming effect of exposure to the low-frequency words was context-dependent,
in that it was enhanced if subjects stayed in the same room.
Other studies have found conflicting results for context-dependent implicit memory.
Jacoby and Witherspoon (1982) reported no effect of context on priming. Amanda Parker
et al. (1999) argued that the effect might depend on whether the indirect memory test
relied on conceptual or perceptual features of the learned material; they found context-
dependence for a conceptual task (category completion) but not a perceptual task (word-
fragment completion). However, Andrew Parker et al. (2007) and Mulligan (2011) have
challenged those findings.
Two intriguing studies have investigated the effect of an olfactory context on implicit
memory. Amanda Parker et al. (2001) had participants solve two Tower of Hanoi puzzles
and trace through a maze while exposed to either lavender or lemon scent. Subjects re-
turned the following day to complete the same tasks and were exposed to either the same
scent or a different scent; there was a context-dependent effect for the maze task (i.e., it was
easier if the same scent was present) but not the Tower of Hanoi. Ball et al. (2010) found
olfactory-context-dependent effects on a word-fragment completion task (an implicit mea-
sure), but discovered that the effect is sensitive to the particular scents used, specifically to
how distinctive and how pleasant they are.
In addition, two studies have demonstrated effects on linguistic production which closely
mirror context-dependent memory effects, although only one of these explicitly makes the
link to context-dependent memory research. In that study, Horton (2007) investigated
whether another person can serve as a “context” which induces an effect on linguistic pro-
duction. Participants first engaged in a category-cued word-fragment-completion task with
two different partners (who were research assistants); the partner would provide a cate-
gory cue (e.g., “musical instrument”), and the participant would then have to complete
the word fragment (e.g., complete B__JO to BANJO). The participant performed this task
in two blocks, one with each of the two partners. Subsequently, participants performed a
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picture naming task, again divided into two blocks, one for each partner. The names of
the depicted objects were words that had been fragment-completed in the earlier task, but
some words that had been completed with Partner A were named with Partner B and vice
versa. The dependent measure was the naming latency, i.e., how long participants took to
name the depicted object. Horton found that participants were quicker to name pictures
if the same partner was sitting next to them who had been with them when they fragment-
completed that word (e.g., a participant who completed BANJO with the “help” of Partner
A the would more rapidly name a picture of a banjo if Partner A was also present for the
naming task than if Partner B was present). Although participants had better-than-chance
explicit recall of which partner had been present when the fragment was completed, there
was no significant correlation across subjects between performance on this recall task and
their naming latency, suggesting that the reaction-time priming effect was not driven by
explicit retrieval of the associated partner’s identity. (That is, participants who were better
at consciously remembering which partner was there when they saw each word were not
necessarily faster to name the depicted objects.)
Horton (2007) suggests that “conversational partners act as contextual cues for the
automatic retrieval of associated information just as different rooms or different physical
contexts can facilitate memory depending on the type of overlap with the context of en-
coding”, and argues that memory may thus play a role in the activation of information as
pragmatically relevant “common ground” (Clark 1996). This is of obvious relevance for
the UBTL, since the identity of an interlocutor, and the common ground shared with that
interlocutor, are natural candidate for the sort of information that could be stored in an
exemplar model as part of the record of the language event.
The final study I wish to discuss in detail is Gurevich et al. (2010). In a remarkable series
of experiments, Gurevich et al. provide a counterpoint to earlier findings (e.g. Bransford
and Franks 1971; Johnson-Laird 1970; Johnson-Laird and R. Stevenson 1970; Sachs 1967)
that suggested that listeners almost immediately discard the surface form of language that
they hear, retaining only the meaning or “gist”. In these experiments, Gurevich et al. had
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participants read stories, and then compared their recognition and recall of sentences in
the stories as compared to erroneous “recognition” and “recall” of semantically equivalent
sentences they had not seen; results were above chance, showing that participants were able
to distinguish between sentences they had seen and ones they had not seen, even though
the “gist” was the same. The finding is all the more notable in that participants were not
told before reading the stories that there would be a memory test later.
Most notable for present purposes, however, was Gurevich et al.’s Experiment 5. Each
participant was paired with an experimental confederate (ostensibly another participant),
who watched two animated cartoons not visible to the participant and then verbally de-
scribed them. In fact, each description was a prewritten script; two such scripts were cre-
ated for each cartoon, and were semantically equivalent but differed in phrasing. (The
confederate had practiced speaking the scripts as if naturally describing the cartoon, and in
debriefing no participants reported suspicion that the description was staged.) Participants
then took a “quiz” in which they had to assess freeze frames from similar cartoons and pick
the one that matched the description. In fact, this quiz was merely a cover task; based
on supposedly good performance, the experimenter invited the subject back for another,
ostensibly unrelated experiment several days later. When the participants returned, they
performed the same task, but now in the role of the “describer”, watching the cartoons
they had previously heard described, and giving their own descriptions. The clauses of the
participants’ descriptions were compared with those of the description they had heard, as
well as those of the semantically equivalent description they had not heard. Despite the
fact the participants were not in any way cued to remember the specific linguistic forms
they had heard, and despite the fact that they produced their own narration a mean of six
days after hearing the confederate’s, they were, at higher-than-chance levels, more likely to
re-use clauses they had heard in the earlier narration word-for-word verbatim, as compared to
semantically equivalent clauses they had not heard.
Gurevich et al. (2010) focus on the exemplar-model implications of their findings (namely
that the exact linguistic forms heard apparently had an effect several days later, and thus
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were apparently stored), and shy away from an implicit-memory account, noting that “while
participants were not asked to consciously recall verbatim utterances, the task did require
that they consciously access the content of the earlier speech.” Nonetheless, they note that
“retention can be both incidental (no deliberation), and implicitly mediated (no explicit
recall)”. From a context-dependent memory perspective, Gurevich et al.’s results can be
seen as a manipulation of the “semantic context” — that is, the “environment” was the
situation depicted in the video. This environment was instantiated during the priming
phase, when they heard the narration, and reinstantiated during the test phase by seeing
the video; when the context was reinstantiated, incidental features of it (i.e., the specific
phrasing of the narration) were reactivated, and implicitly influenced performance on the
narration task.
Such studies show that there is scope for context-dependent effects on indirect memory
tasks, including language production tasks. Moreover, as I have argued in the preceding
sections, the conceptual underpinnings of the UBTL predict that some sort of context-
dependent effects should be found. If mental representations of language include the non-
linguistic context, then varying the nonlinguistic context should alter those representations
in detectable ways.
1.4 Summary
What I have argued above can be summarized as follows. The UBTL as it presently stands
has argued for an explanation of language grounded in very general cognitive mechanisms.
In support of this proposal, UBTL adherents have offered ample evidence that many aspects
of language comprehension, production, and acquisition can be accounted for by these
general mechanisms, without the need for additional mechanisms specific to language or
to a particular level of linguistic structure. However, what has not been so well recognized
(although see Ibbotson 2013) is that a theory of this generality must also take account of
its potential predictions even when they reach beyond the realm of what has traditionally
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been studied within linguistics. It is not sufficient to look at known linguistic phenomena
and attempt to explain them by means of the theory; we must also look at the theory itself
and see what it predicts or implies, even when these predictions and implications are not
something that the theory had intended to explain.
In other words, although the UBTL is a theory developed for language, its conceptual
machinery is so general that it potentially explains a great deal more, and it must be eval-
uated based on how reasonably it explains everything it actually applies to, not only what
it wants to explain. Testing the theory only on a subset of its conceptual domain is like
gauging one’s marksmanship by shooting at a fly with a shotgun; one must check not only
whether the fly was hit, but also whether anything else was hit.
The UBTL’s postulation that language use is sensitive to all manner of specific cooccur-
rence patterns is as yet unaccompanied by a full explanation of which cooccurrences win
out over which others under which circumstances. As Ibbotson (2013) points out:
Usage-based approaches might respond by saying that the meaning is the sum
total of how the form is used in a communicative context, however for those
seeking more detail, usage-based theorists need to provide a more mechanistic
account that integrates semantic and formal generalizations. One way to tackle
this is to ask, where does the meaning of linguistic form x come from in the
child’s environment?
In addition, as noted earlier, the rejection of distinctions between levels of structure, to-
gether with the rejection of acquisition as the sole locus of development of mental represen-
tations, means that this question actually becomes “Where does every property of linguistic
form x come from in a given person’s environment?”
The UBTL’s reliance on the “environment” means that it offloads into reality a good
deal of what more traditional theories keep within assumptions. That is, where other the-
ories might assume that certain sorts of patterns arise due to innate knowledge or learning
constraints, the UBTL argues that, as Croft (2003: 102) puts it, “the structure of the lan-
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guage reflects in some way the structure of experience, that is to say, the structure of the
world”. As mentioned before, this move strengthens the theory from a logical perspective,
insofar as it can explain just as much with fewer assumptions. However, it also puts the
onus on the theory to demonstrate that the world really does have such structure, and,
moreover, that regularities of experience really can and really do translate into regularities
of mental representations (typically assessed via behavioral measures, but also potentially
via neuroimaging or other techniques).
1.5 The present study
The present study takes a small step towards addressing the issues raised above. Essen-
tially, I ask: Are the broad implications of current UBTL proposals really valid? Can
there be incidental learning of arbitrary patterns of cooccurrence between language and
the nonlinguistic context? Specifically, can the structural priming effect be modulated by
a context-dependent effect, as the notion of rich memory storage proposed by UBTL re-
searchers would seem to imply?
Put another way, the hypotheses of the present study is essentially an omnibus package
of strong hypotheses from each of the components of the UBTL discussed earlier: can
adults (because there is learning across the lifespan) learn a cross-modal association between
a syntactic structure (because there is no difference between that and learning any other
language structure) and a feature of the nonlinguistic context (because that context is stored
in the exemplar representation) in such a way that we can observe an effect on linguistic
production? There is evidence for each individual piece of this hypothesis, as described in
the preceding pages, but there is no direct evidence that all of these claims will actually
hold at the same time.
To test this, a series of experiments were conducted in which participants were exposed
to cooccurrence patterns of language and nonlanguage that were completely reliable but
also incidental (i.e., it was not necessary to pay attention to the pattern to complete the
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task). As outlined above, the UBTL hypothesis in this situation is that the nonlinguistic
context should be stored along with the linguistic exemplars, and thus that the pattern of
cooccurrence should be able to influence participants’ subsequent use of language.
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Chapter 2
Methods
The five experiments that were conducted were broadly similar in design. To simplify pre-
sentation, this chapter gives an overall description of the methodology. Subsequent chap-
ters report on each individual experiment, and each such chapter will describe how the basic
methodology was modified for that particular experiment.
On the most general level, the procedure involved two phases: first, a “prime phase”, in
which participants were exposed to a combination of language and nonlinguistic context;
and second, a “test phase” in which participants were exposed to the nonlinguistic contexts
from the prime phase while performing a production task. The nature of nonlinguistic
context differed from one experiment to another: it was either the background color of
the screen, a sound which played along with each stimulus, background music that played
throughout the task, or the room in which the subject performed the task.
2.1 Materials
Stimuli for the experiments consisted of 48 sentences and 24 pictures. The sentences con-
sisted of 24 pairs, each with one active sentence and one passive sentence. The two sen-
tences in each pair were semantically equivalent, differing only in voice. The pictures were
black-and-white line drawings used in Bock (1986).
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2.2 Participants
All participants were undergraduates recruited from linguistics courses. Most were enrolled
in an introductory class and had little or no prior exposure to linguistics. Some were re-
cruited from upper-division classes that did not deal directly with psycholinguistics or syn-
tax (e.g., historical linguistics). Students received extra credit in their course as compensa-
tion for their participation. As described below, participants answered a post-test question
to assess whether they were aware of the experimental manipulation.
2.3 Procedure
Subjects were greeted either by the experimenter or a research assistant, but interaction
between them was limited as all instructions were delivered via the computer interface. The
experimenter/research assistant’s only role was to provide the participant with the consent
form and obtain student ID information so that course credit could be given. Although
the experimenter and research assistant were not blind to the hypotheses of the study,
subjects were assigned to conditions in a randomized manner by the computer only after
the experiment had actually begun. Thus, it was not possible for the person setting up the
experiment to know what condition the subject would be assigned to.
After reading and signing a consent form, participants were seated at a computer, in
front of which, on the desk, was a microphone on a small stand. An initial instruction
screen told participants that they would see a series of sentences displayed, and that they
should read each one aloud. The microphone was calibrated so that participants did not
need to learn toward it or speak loudly.
Participants then began the prime phase, during which they saw a series of 24 sentences,
half active and half passive. Each sentence was chosen from a different active/passive pair;
thus, each subject saw one sentence from each pair, and no individual subject saw active and
passive versions of any individual sentence. Each sentence appeared in black text inside a
white box on a screen by itself. After reading each sentence, participants clicked a “done”
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button at the bottom of the screen to move to the next sentence. Participants’ readings of
the sentences were recorded but not analyzed; the purpose of the task was simply to ensure
that participants actually read the sentences instead of blindly clicking through them, and
the recordings were listened to just to make sure they had done so.
Along with each sentence there was a nonlinguistic “context,” which varied from one
experiment to another. For each experiment, there were two contexts, and for each par-
ticipant, one of these two contexts was present for all active sentences, while the other
was present for all passive sentences. Thus each participant saw 12 active sentences, each
accompanied by a nonlinguistic context, and 12 passive sentences, each accompanied by
another nonlinguistic context. I use the terms “active context” and “passive context” to
refer to the context shown with active sentences and the context shown with passive sen-
tences, respectively.
After reading all 24 sentences, participants saw a second instruction screen, which told
them that they would now see a series of pictures, and that they should speak aloud a one-
sentence description of each picture. They then began the test phase, in which they saw 24
stimulus pictures in a row. The pictures were black and white line drawings and displayed
in a white box of similar size and position to that used for the text. (The box sizes differed
slightly from one picture to another because the pictures had different dimensions.) As
with the sentences, participants spoke their description and then clicked a “done” button
to proceed to the next picture.
Along with each picture, one of the two contexts was present. For half of the pictures,
the active context was present, and for the other half, the passive context was present. Thus
each participant saw 24 pictures, 12 of which were accompanied by a context previously
encountered when reading active sentences, and the other 12 of which were accompanied
by a context previously encountered when reading passive sentences.
The presentation of contexts was varied between subjects in certain ways to guard
against order-of-presentation effects. For each phase of the experiment, some subjects saw
“blocked” stimuli and others saw “random” stimuli. Blocked stimuli meant that subjects
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saw all stimuli with one context first, then all stimuli with the other context; random stimuli
meant that subjects saw stimuli from the two contexted randomly intermixed. For subjects
seeing blocked stimuli, the choice of which stimulus block came first (active or passive) was
counterbalanced across subjects. The choice of blocked/random presentation was coun-
terbalanced independently for the two phases — that is, an individual subject might see
blocked stimuli in the prime phase but random stimuli in the test phase.
Thus, a “blocked prime” subject saw either 12 active sentences in a row followed by 12
passive sentences in a row, or 12 passive sentences in a row followed by 12 active sentences
in a row. A “random prime” subject also saw 12 active sentences and 12 passive sentences,
but saw them randomly intermixed. A “blocked test” subject saw either 12 pictures in a
row accompanied by the active context followed by 12 pictures in a row accompanied by
the passive context, or 12 pictures in a row accompanied by the passive context followed
by 12 pictures in a row accompanied by the active context. A “random test” subject also
saw 12 pictures accompanied by the active context and 12 pictures accompanied by the
passive context, but saw them randomly intermixed.
Regardless of whether stimuli were blocked or random, the order of the individual sen-
tences and pictures was random for each subject, as was the choice of which particular
sentences were active and which were passive (i.e., whether the active or passive sentence
was chosen from each sentence pair), as well as the choice of which individual pictures
were paired with which context. For instance, although all “blocked prime” subjects saw
12 active sentences in a row and 12 passive sentences in a row, they did not all even see
the same sentences, let alone in the same order. Some subjects, for instance, saw “The rain
was soaking the patio furniture” in the active block, while others instead saw “The patio
furniture was getting soaked by the rain” in the passive block. Also, among these “blocked
prime” subjects, some saw an active block first and some saw a passive block first. Likewise,
in the test phase, all subjects saw 12 pictures accompanied by the active context, but not all
subjects saw the same pictures with the active context; rather, a random set of 12 pictures
was chosen for each individual subject, and those 12 were shown with the active context,
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while the other 12 were shown with the passive context.
In short, everything was randomized as much as possible, so that, across subjects, no
individual stimulus had any consistent sequential position, nor any reliable pattern of oc-
currence with either of the two voices or with any other stimulus.
After describing all 24 pictures, subjects were taken to a short questionnaire screen.
There, they were asked to provide their age and sex. They also were asked whether they
had noticed any pattern in the sentences, pictures, and/or contexts, or in the relationship
between the sentences/pictures and the contexts. After completing this questionnaire sub-
jects saw a “Thank you” screen and were done with the experiment.
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Chapter 3
Experiment 1a: Color
3.1 Participants
Participants were 42 undergraduates recruited from introductory linguistics classes. They
received extra credit in their course as compensation for participating.
3.2 Methods
This experiment followed exactly the pattern outlined above. The nonlinguistic context
that was manipulated was the color of the screen: either red or blue. Thus, for a given
subject, if the “active context” was blue, then all active sentences were shown on a blue
background, while all passive sentences were on a red background; if the active context was
red, then it was the other way around.
3.3 Results
Subjects’ readings of the prime sentences were listened to only to verify that subjects did
in fact perform the reading task (which all subjects did); their readings do not figure in any
analyses. Data from one subject, however, were excluded from analysis because many of the
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subject’s responses on the picture-description task were ungrammatical (e.g., “a man getting
stinged by a bee”), raising doubt about whether the subject was really a native speaker.
Subjects’ responses to the post-test question were inspected to see if they reported any
awareness of the link between the colors and the sentences. No subjects did. Interestingly,
many subjects claimed to have noticed correlations which did not in fact exist, typically
involving a link between the color and the unpleasantness of the depicted or described
situation. A typical subject claimed: “The worst scenarios were displayed on a red back-
ground and more positve ones on blue backgrounds.” The willingness of subjects to reach
for dubious semantic relationships while remaining oblivious to the 100%-reliable corre-
lation between color and syntax underscores how unaware the typical language user is of
syntactic structure.
The audio recordings of subjects’ picture descriptions were coded for which voice they
were in. Response were coded as “active”, “passive”, “agentless passive” or “other”. Re-
sponses were coded as active if they contained an active transitive clause whose arguments
referred to the central participants in the depicted event; they were coded as passive if they
contained a full passive (with agent in a by phrase) whose arguments referred to the central
participants. They were coded as “agentless passive” if they contained a one-argument pas-
sive referring to one of the central participants, with the other participant either omitted
or expressed in some other fashion (e.g., in an oblique phrase). They were coded as “other”
if they met none of the above criteria.
A few particular cases should be noted. First, responses could be coded as passive
whether they used be or get as the auxiliary. Second, agentless passives where the “agent”
was expressed, but not in a by phrase, were coded as “agentless passive” rather than passive;
this included for instance cases where the agent was expressed as an instrument (e.g., a boy
getting hit in the head with a baseball). Third, the criteria for coding as active/passive were
applied by reference to the central participants in the depicted event, not to any minor de-
tails of the picture that the subject happened to include in the description. Thus, responses
were still coded as active or passive even if the described event was not exactly the “in-
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tended” depicted event, as long as it had the same participants. For instance, in describing
the picture of a veterinarian being bitten by a cat, some participants used a description like
a vet holding a cat; this was still counted as transitive because it described the veterinarian
and the cat and was potentially passivizable (e.g., a cat being held by a vet is possible). Like-
wise, for the picture showing a soldier being run over by a tank, the coding was done based
on how the soldier and tank were expressed, ignoring any references to the soldier’s gun;
thus a description such as a soldier getting run over by a tank and dropping his gun was coded
as “passive” because the clause involving the soldier and tank is passive, even though the
conjoined clause describing the soldier and his gun happens to be active.
Each of the 41 participants provided 24 responses, for a total of 984 responses. Of these
790 (80.3%) were coded as active or passive and 194 (19.7%) were coded as “agentless
passive” or “other”. Except where noted, the analyses reported below were conducted only
on responses coded as active or passive.
The results were submitted to a logistic regression using the R package lme4 (Bates et
al. 2013; R Core Team 2013, version 1.0-5) with ObservedVoice (active or passive) as the
dependent variable on each trial. The predictors included in the regression were:
1. ActiveContext — Which color was primed for active voice in the priming phase
2. Context — Which color was shown on the current trial
3. BlockedPrimes — Whether the primes were blocked or random
4. BlockedTest — Whether the test trials were blocked or random
5. StimIndex — The index of the trial within the sequence of trials, i.e., 1 for the first
picture, 2 for the second, etc.
6. ActiveProp — The proportion of trials so far for which the subject’s response was in
the active voice
7. SubjID — A random effect for the identity of the subject
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8. PicName — A random effect for the particular picture described on this trial
All interactions of up to three predictors were also included.1
The ActiveProp proportion was calculated relative to all active/passive responses by the
subject so far, ignoring “other” responses, and was smoothed to avoid giving undue weight
to early trials. Thus ActiveProp was calculated as:
1 + # of active responses so far
2 + total # of responses so far
The 1 and 2 are the smoothing factors. The smoothing was done because otherwise there
would be no ActiveProp for the first trial (since there are no “responses so far” to divide
by), and every second trial would have ActiveProp either 1 or 0 (because on every second
trial either “all” responses so far — that is, the one response so far — were active or all were
passive. The smoothing “hedges” the proportions so that, after N trials, the minimum
possible ActiveProp is 1
N+1
(instead of 0) and the maximum is N
N+1
(instead of 1). This
reflects the fact that a high or low proportion of active voice is more meaningful after a
large number of trials than after a short number.
The ActiveProp variable was included in order to capture a self-priming or persistence
effect within each subject. Given earlier research on syntactic priming (e.g. Gries andWulff
2009; Jaeger and Snider 2008), it was reasonable to expect that subjects who began using a
given voice would prime themselves to use the same voice on the next trial, thus potentially
leading to a cascade effect in which each subsequent use of a particular voice makes them
even more likely to use it yet again. Therefore, ActiveProp was included to measure the
extent of such syntactic perserveration within each subject.2
1The random effects included here were adjustments to intercepts. Models with random-slope predictors
for the targeted effect — that is, effects for the Context-ActiveContext interaction, grouped by SubjID and
by PicName — were also run for this and all other experiments. These models did not differ significantly
from those with random intercepts only, so the final models reported here are those with random intercepts
only.
2It is important to distinguish between the self-priming represented by ActiveProp and the subject-specific
voice preference captured by the random effect of subject. The random effect takes account of an individual
subject’s overall preference for one voice or the other across all trials; it does not take account of how that
preference is distributed over the sequence of trials. The ActiveProp does take this temporal distribution into
account, because it measures, for each trial, the proportion of active voice used on preceding trials only. As
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A stepwise model selection process was used, eliminating predictors one at a time until
all remaining predictors were at least marginally significant (at the p < 0:1 level) or were
qualified by a significant higher-order interaction. This rather liberal p-value threshold was
chosen simply to allow the model to retain predictors whose influence on the model might
be of interpretive interest despite not reaching the traditional p < 0:05 significance level,
without implying that these predictors were in fact interpreted as signficant. In other words,
marginally significant predictors were left in the model to avoid discarding any lurking hints
of a theoretically relevant effect, but they do not figure in the discussion below except where
they suggest that such a hint may actually be lurking, and in such cases they are clearly
distinguished as “marginally significant” and not interpreted as being of equal importance
with effects which did reach the p < 0:05 level.
The resulting model had a marginal R2 of 0.10 (computed using the method of Nak-
agawa and Schielzeth (2013), with the R package MuMIn), a classification accuracy of
73.8% (compared with a baseline of 58.5% based only on the overall total proportions of
active and passive responses3), and a point-biserial response correlation of 0.554. The final
model is summarized below5:
an example, consider two hypothetical subjects: one who uses active voice on the first 12 trials, then passive
voice on the last 12 trials; and another who alternates between active and passive voice on every trial. Both
will be assigned the same offset by the random effect, because their overall proportions of each voice are equal
(both use active exactly half the time and passive the other half). But their behavior from the point of view
of ActiveProp is very different: the first subject has a tendency to keep using whatever voice he has used the
most up until that time; the second subject has a tendency not to use the voice he has used the most up until
that time (i.e., he has a strong tendency to oscillate between voices). Thus the ActiveProp and the random
effect of subject capture different information.
3That is, 58.5% of the responses were active voice, meaning that a naive classification that always predicts
active voice would be right 58.5% of the time.
4The point-biserial response correlation is the Pearson correlation coefficient of the predicted probability
of passive voice on each trial and a binary response variable set to 0 if active voice was observed on that trial
and 1 if passive voice was observed. While the classification accuracy only measures whether the model was
“in the right direction” — i.e., whether the observed result had a predicted probability of 50% or higher —
the point-biserial correlation also takes account of the model’s “confidence” in its predicted outcomes. Given
that passive voice was observed on a trial, a model that predicts a 49% probability of passive and a model
that predicts a 1% probability of passive both make the wrong prediction; but the second model is “more
wrong” because it is very confident about its incorrect prediction, i.e., it gives a very low probability to the
event that actually occurred.
5All model tables use Type II Wald Chi-squared tests.
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Chisq Df Pr(>Chisq)
ActiveContext 0.9081 1 0.340628
Context 0.7031 1 0.401754
BlockedPrimes 3.1170 1 0.077477 .
BlockedTest 1.5512 1 0.212964
ActiveProp 5.7711 1 0.016292 *
StimIndex 1.0912 1 0.296199
ActiveContext:Context 0.4971 1 0.480764
ActiveContext:BlockedPrimes 1.0888 1 0.296742
ActiveContext:ActiveProp 0.4189 1 0.517496
Context:BlockedPrimes 0.1412 1 0.707082
Context:BlockedTest 6.0364 1 0.014013 *
Context:ActiveProp 1.4144 1 0.234324
Context:StimIndex 0.1015 1 0.750092
BlockedPrimes:BlockedTest 2.7740 1 0.095807 .
BlockedTest:StimIndex 0.0002 1 0.988462
ActiveContext:Context:BlockedPrimes 9.5816 1 0.001965 **
ActiveContext:Context:ActiveProp 3.8810 1 0.048834 *
Context:BlockedTest:StimIndex 4.2502 1 0.039245 *
The predicted effect was an interaction between ActiveContext and Context, such that
active voice was predicted to be more common for pictures displayed with the “active color”
(i.e., the color present with active sentences in the prime phase), and likewise for passive
voice. This interaction was not found to be significant. In fact, it was only partially in
the right direction: the nature of the nonsignficant interaction was that passive voice was
always preferred when the passive color was red, but it was especially preferred when red
was also the color seen with the picture. Thus the hypothesis was not supported.
However, there was a significant (p < 0:01) three-way interaction among ActiveContext,
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Figure 3.1: Effect plot for interaction of ActiveContext, Context, and BlockedPrimes. The Y axis represents
probability of passive voice. The top two panels represent the cases where subjects saw random primes;
here the predicted effect is observed, with participants using comparatively more active voice when the active
color was shown, and likewise for passive voice. The bottom panels represent cases where subjects saw blocked
primes; in these cases there was little difference in voice usage across experimental conditions.
Context and BlockedPrimes. An effect plot for this effect is shown in Figure 3.1.6 The
nature of the effect was that the predicted effect was observed only for participants who
saw randomly mixed primes (rather than blocked).
There was also a main effect of ActiveProp; this was a self-priming effect, with partic-
ipants being more likely to use active voice to describe a picture the more often they had
6In this and all other effect plots, the Y-axis values measure the probability of passive voice – the higher
a point, the more likely passive voice is. The effect plots were created using the “effects” package for R (Fox
2003).
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ActiveContext*Context*ActiveProp effect plot
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Figure 3.2
used it to describe earlier pictures.
This effect was qualified by a significant (p < 0:05) interaction between ActiveContext,
Context, and ActiveProp, indicating that the strength of the self-priming tendency varied
depending on the relationship between the trial context and the active context. Figure 3.2
summarizes the effect. The overall nature of the effect was that the self-priming tendency
was strongest when the passive color was shown, and weaker or even reversed when the
active color was shown. This effect thus does not have any clear interpretation with regard
to the influence of the contextual prime on subjects’ production. One could speculate that
the interaction is due to the asymmetric markedness of active and passive voice. That is,
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it might be that the learned association between the color and the voice did not succeed in
priming participants to use each voice with its color, but did succeed in interfering with their
production processes to the extent that it disrupted their natural tendency to persist with
the use of a single voice. However, there is no obvious reason why such interference would
suppress self-priming only with the marked (i.e., passive) voice; if anything, the natural
hypothesis would be that the less-frequent passive would be more easily disrupted, whereas
in fact the reverse was found (self-priming was stronger when the passive color was shown).
Finally, there was a significant interaction of Context and BlockedTest, which was qual-
ified by a signficant three-way interaction between Context, BlockedTest, and StimIndex.
The nature of these effects was that for some combinations of color and blocked/random
presentation, participants became more likely to use active voice as they progressed through
the trials, while for other combinations, they became less likely to use active voice. Since
the interaction does not involve ActiveContext, it is unrelated to the priming manipula-
tion. It also has no clear interpretation with regard to the hypotheses. It is unclear why, for
instance, participants would be expected to use more and more active voice, but only on
screens with a red background — let alone why they would do this only when test stimuli
were blocked but do the reverse when test stimuli were randomly interleaved.
All these interactions, however, must be qualified with the statement that a random-
effects-only model actually does a slightly better job of accounting for the results. A model
was fit on the same data, using only the random effects for SubjID and PicName. This
random model had a classification accuracy of 74.4%, slightly higher than the 73.8% of
the original model. In addition, the point-biserial correlation between the predicted prob-
abilities and observed outcomes was 0.551, slightly higher than the 0.545 for the original
model.
To assess whether the inclusion of agentless passives would affect the results, the same
analysis was rerun, but now with all “agentless passive” responses included as passive re-
sponses. (For instance, both a car getting towed and a car getting towed by a tow truck were both
considered passive.) There were 61 such responses.
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The results were not meaningfully affected. The significant effects described above
remained significant, with the exception of the Context-BlockedTest-StimIndex interaction,
which, as mentioned, did not carry hypothesis-relevant information anyway. The only new
significant effect was an interaction of BlockedPrimes and BlockedTest, indicating that
passive voice was more common when primes were blocked but test trials were random,
or vice versa; this effect does not involve either Context or ActiveContext and thus also
does not bear on the hypothesis. The relationship between the model including agentless
passives and its corresponding random-effects-only model was similar to that for the model
without agentless passives (CA of 70.7% for the full model vs. 72.2% for the randommodel;
point-biserial correlation .50 for the full model vs. .52 for the random model), and the R2
value of 0.10 was the same as for the model without agentless passives.
3.4 Discussion
Overall, the results from Experiment 1a do not lend support to the hypothesis suggested
by the UBTL, namely that the priming manipulation can create an association between the
background color and the voice. There were some three-way interactions that involved the
link between the primed voice and the voice used in picture descriptions, but these inter-
actions did not relate in any simple way to the 2x2 crossing of these two variables. That
is, participants did apparently behave differently depending on which voice was primed
with which color, but the differences in their behavior do not bear any obvious relation-
ship to that priming. The inclusion of agentless passives did not materially impact these
conclusions.
In addition, a model using random effects only accounts for the observed data slightly
better than a model that takes account of the various predictors that were supposed to
explain the variability. This indicates that, although significant effects were observed, the
overall pattern of results can just as easily be explained by a combination of per-picture
biases (i.e., some pictures are more likely to be described with one voice than the other)
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and per-subject biases (i.e., some subjects tend to use active voice more than others). This
conclusion is also consistent with the low marginal R2 of the full model (0.10), which
indicates that the fixed effects of the model explain little variance beyond that accounted
for by the random effects. In other words, there is no real reason to suppose that the
experimental manipulation had any effect beyond the intrinsic preferences of individual
speakers and the intrinsic linguistic affordances of the stimulus pictures.
The one result that did support the hypothesis was that the predicted effect was present
for a subgroup of subjects, namely those who saw randomly mixed primes rather than
blocked primes. It is therefore possible that the block structure of the priming influences
its effectiveness. When the primes were blocked, only one color change occurred during the
prime phase (between the two blocks), but if the primes were mixed, the color would change
back and forth between red and blue many times. It could be that this made the color
changes more salient and thus enhanced the priming effect. In order to test this hypothesis,
Experiment 1b was run, duplicating the procedure of Experiment 1a but restricting only to
random-prime presentation, as will be described in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
Experiment 1b: Random-prime color
4.1 Participants
Participants were 18 undergraduates, recruited as described for Experiment 1a. None of
the participants had participated in Experiment 1a.
4.2 Methods
As discussed in the results section, the outcome of Experiment 1a suggested a followup
version. Experiment 1b was the same as Experiment 1a, except that all participants saw
random primes (there were no blocked primes). Both Random Test and Blocked Test pre-
sentations still existed, however.
4.3 Results
Data from three subjects had to be excluded. One subject noticed the association between
the color and the voice. Another subject reported noticing a relationship between the color
and the “sentence structure”, which essentially meant this subject had noticed the experi-
mental manipulation. A third subject gave bizarre free-association responses to all pictures
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(e.g., the picture of lightning striking a church was described with Jesus is back), rather than
describing them as such.
This left 15 subjects. Of the 360 responses from these subjects, 283 (78.6%) were coded
as active or passive and the other 77 (21.4%) were coded as agentless passive or “other”.
These proportions are similar to those observed in Experiment 1a.
The active/passive responses were submitted to a logistic regression as described in Ex-
periment 1a. The BlockedPrimes predictor was not used, since in this experiment all sub-
jects saw random primes. The resulting model had a marginalR2 of 0.12 and a classification
accuracy of 80.6%, compared with a baseline of 59.0%. The model is summarized below.
Chisq Df Pr(>Chisq)
ActiveContext 1.8141 1 0.17802
Context 1.3888 1 0.23860
ActiveProp 6.3539 1 0.01171 *
StimIndex 0.2463 1 0.61970
ActiveContext:StimIndex 3.0431 1 0.08108 .
Context:StimIndex 3.9853 1 0.04590 *
Again, the predicted interaction of ActiveContext and Context was not found. This
time the effect was essentially totally absent, with virtually no difference in preference for
active vs. passive depending on which color had been associated with which voice. Thus
the hypothesis was not supported.
The only meaningful significant effect was a main effect of ActiveProp, summarized in
Figure 4.1. This was a self-priming effect, such that the more active voice a participant had
used at a given point in the test phase, the more likely he or she was to again use active
voice.
There was also a significant interaction of Context and StimIndex, as well as amarginally
significant interaction of ActiveContext and StimIndex. Given that these effects do not
involve the experimental manipulation (i.e., the relationship between Context and Active-
Context), they have no clear interpretation with regard to the hypotheses. Conceptually,
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Figure 4.1: Effect plot for the effect of ActiveProp. The greater the proportion of active voice used so far
during the test phase, the lower the likelihood of using passive voice.
effects involving Context or ActiveContext but not both indicate that the particular color
used had an influence on the choice of voice — that is, the color red had an intrinsic impact
on the use of active vs. passive voice, regardless of which voice it was associated with, and
that the color blue had a different intrinsic impact. Such effects are difficult to explain
since there is no obvious reason why a color in and of itself would induce such effects on
language use.
Again, however, a random-effects-only model predicted the results slightly better (CA
83.7% vs. 80.6% for the full model; point-biserial correlation 0.684 vs. 0.677 for the full
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model).
Again, a version of the model was fit including agentless passives as passives. (There
were 24 agentless-passive responses.) The result was effectively the same as the original
model. A new significant effect of ActiveContext and StimIndex emerged, such that par-
ticipants became progressively more likely to use active voice if the active color was red,
and less likely to use active voice if the active color was blue; however, this effect did not
involve the Context variable, and so did not involve participants responding differently to
different colors in the test phase, and hence the effect makes no statement with regard
to the hypotheses. Although the model with agentless passives had a higher marginal R2
(0.22) than the model without agentless passives, its classification accuracy (77.5%) and
point-biserial response correlation (0.63) were slightly lower. The agentless-passives model
and its corresponding random-effects-only model had essentially equivalent performance
(random-effects-only CA was the same at 77.5%; point-biserial slightly lower at 0.61).
4.4 Discussion
Although Experiment 1a suggested that the predicted effect might hold conditionally, when
subjects were exposed to primes randomly mixed between the two voice/color pairs, this hy-
pothesis was not borne out by Experiment 1b. In fact, no meaningful effects were found
except for a simple self-priming effect. Also, the results can again be explained more par-
simoniously by simply allowing for individual differences in voice preference and picture-
specific differences in linguistic affordances (i.e., how naturally each depicted scene can be
described with active vs. passive voice). Thus, Experiment 1b does not support the hypoth-
esis that speakers can learn incidental relationships between language and nonlanguage.
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Chapter 5
Experiment 2: Sound
5.1 Participants
Participants were 41 undergraduates recruited as described previously. None of the subjects
had participated in either of the other two experiments.
5.2 Methods
This experiment followed the same paradigm as Experiment 1a, except that the nonlin-
guistic context that was manipulated was a sound clip that played when each stimulus was
shown. The two sounds were a “sad trombone” riff and the sound of tinkling chimes. The
two clips were approximately equal in length (about 1 second each). Participants wore
headphones when doing this experiment. When each stimulus (either sentence or picture)
was displayed, one of the two sounds played over the headphones.
5.3 Results
Data from one participant were excluded because the participant indicated in the post-test
question that she “noticed I said things differently active/passive”. This was regarded as
sufficient awareness of the purpose of the experiment to warrant excluding the data.
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Of the 960 responses from the remaining 40 subjects, 748 (77.9%) were coded as ac-
tive/passive and the other 212 (22.1%) as agentless passive or other.
The active/passive responses were submitted to a logistic regression as described above.
The resulting model had a marginalR2 of .20. a classification accuracy of 75.7% (compared
with a baseline of 52.1%), and a point-biserial response correlation of 0.55. The model is
summarized below.
62
Chisq Df Pr(>Chisq)
ActiveContext 0.0653 1 0.79825
Context 1.4549 1 0.22774
BlockedPrimes 0.0429 1 0.83597
BlockedTest 0.3465 1 0.55611
ActiveProp 53.9345 1 2.073e-13 ***
StimIndex 0.0477 1 0.82720
ActiveContext:Context 5.8703 1 0.01540 *
ActiveContext:BlockedTest 3.1653 1 0.07522 .
ActiveContext:StimIndex 5.5444 1 0.01854 *
Context:BlockedTest 0.3798 1 0.53773
Context:StimIndex 0.1575 1 0.69150
BlockedPrimes:BlockedTest 0.7398 1 0.38971
BlockedPrimes:ActiveProp 0.4083 1 0.52284
BlockedPrimes:StimIndex 0.1877 1 0.66485
BlockedTest:ActiveProp 2.6105 1 0.10616
BlockedTest:StimIndex 0.4430 1 0.50568
ActiveProp:StimIndex 4.5194 1 0.03351 *
ActiveContext:Context:BlockedTest 3.5953 1 0.05794 .
ActiveContext:Context:StimIndex 3.2704 1 0.07054 .
Context:BlockedTest:StimIndex 4.5977 1 0.03201 *
BlockedPrimes:BlockedTest:ActiveProp 3.1105 1 0.07779 .
BlockedPrimes:BlockedTest:StimIndex 3.3840 1 0.06583 .
In this case, the interaction between ActiveContext and Context was significant — but
the direction of the effect was the opposite of the prediction (see Figure 5.1). When the
chime sound was associated with active voice, there was little difference in participants’
usage of voice depending on which sound they heard; but when the “sad trombone” sound
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Figure 5.1: Interaction between ActiveContext and Context. The Y axis represents probability of passive
voice. The interaction was in the opposite of the predicted direction: when the “sad trombone” sound was
associated with active voice (right panel), participants were in fact more likely to use the passive voice when
hearing that sound.
was associated with active voice (right panel), participants were in fact more likely to use the
passive voice when hearing that sound. Thus the hypothesis was definitely not supported.
This interaction was qualified by twomarginally-significant three-way interactions: ActiveContext-
Context-BlockedPrimes and ActiveContext-Context-StimIndex. The first of these is sum-
marized in Figure 5.2; the nature of the effect was that the previously-mentioned interac-
tion of ActiveContext and Context occurred only when participants had blocked tests (not
random tests). The second of the three-way interactions, with StimIndex, was such that
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ActiveContext*Context*BlockedTest effect plot
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Figure 5.2: Interaction between ActiveContext, Context, and BlockedTest. The reverse-direction interaction
of ActiveContext and Context was essentially confined to cases where the participants had blocked tests
(bottom panels). When tests were randomly mixed (top panels), there was no major interaction between
ActiveContext and Context.
participants’ use of active vs. passive voice when the “chime” sound was present tended to
change over the course of the experiment, but their use of active vs. passive when the “sad
trombone” sound was present did not shift much. The effect is summarized in Figure 5.3.
The previously-seen self-priming main effect of ActiveProp was also significant. Here
it was qualified by an interaction between ActiveProp and StimIndex, such that the self-
priming effect became stronger as an individual participant progressed through the experi-
ment.
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ActiveContext*Context*StimIndex effect plot
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Figure 5.3: Interaction between ActiveContext, Context, and StimIndex. For “chime” trials (i.e., when the
chime sound played), participants’ use of active vs. passive changed over the course of the experiment,
although the direction of the change (more active vs. more passive) varied. For “sad trombone” trials there
was little change in participants’ use of active vs. passive as the experiment went on.
Finally, there was a significant three-way interaction between Context, BlockedTest,
and StimIndex. As with similar interactions discussed before, this effect did not involve
the experimental manipulation and thus does not bear on the hypotheses.
Again, a random-effects-only model was fit on the same data, and again this model
slightly outperformed the original model (CA 78.5%, point-biserial response correlation
0.62).
The model was again re-fit including agentless passives. The results were substantially
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unchanged. Some effects that were previously marginally significant now reached the .05
threshold; of these, the only one involving the targeted interaction was the ActiveContext-
Context-BlockedTest interaction discussed above. The other effects that reached signifance
only with the addition of agentless passives were all extraneous effects not involving the
targeted interaction (ActiveContext-BlockedTest-StimIndex, BlockedPrimes-BlockedTest-
ActiveProp, and BlockedTest-ActiveProp-StimIndex). The random-effects-only model with
agentless passives outperformed its corresponding mixed-effects model by about the same
margins as for the models without agentless passives.
5.4 Discussion
In Experiment 2 the results again did not support the hypothesis that people can be primed
by an incidental association between language and nonlinguistic context. In this case, there
was a significant effect of the sound-voice association, but the effect was opposite to the
predicted direction: if participants heard a “sad trombone” sound while reading active-voice
sentences, they were in fact more likely to use passive voice if the same sound played when
they saw a picture they had to describe. Even this effect, however, was again qualified by
the finding that inter-subject and inter-picture variability in voice preference describes the
results slightly better than do the purported contextual effects.
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Chapter 6
Experiment 3: Music
6.1 Participants
Participants were 59 undergraduates recruited as described earlier, none of whom had par-
ticipated in any of the other experiments.
6.2 Methods
In this experiment, the nonlinguistic context that was manipulated was music. There were
two music clips: Mozart’s Piano Concerto No. 24 in CMinor, and “People Make theWorld
Go Around,” a jazz piece from Milt Jackson’s album Sunflower. These pieces were chosen
because they were previously used by S. M. Smith (1985) to demonstrate that music can
produce context-dependent memory effects. Both pieces are entirely instrumental, so there
was no possibility of priming from sung lyrics.
For this experiment, there were no random-order stimuli, in either prime or test phase.
The reason for this was that the musical context inherently involved a certain contintuity,
and random presentation would break this continuity. For random presentation, the music
would have to switch back and forth from one piece to another, with a single piece perhaps
playing for no longer than the five seconds or so that it took the participant to read the
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sentence or describe the picture. In such a situation, it would be misleading to say that
different “music” stimuli had been presented to the subjects, since isolated five-second
clips of music are closer to simple sound clips. Thus, in order to ensure that participants
experienced overall “background music” as the context, all participants saw blocked stimuli.
Experiments 1a, 1b and 2 had all found a strong self-priming effect. In addition, in sub-
jectively listening to the subjects’ recorded responses, it seemed that some subjects would
“get into a rut”, giving many answers in a row not only with the same voice, but using simi-
lar prosody, with virtually no temporal gap between responses, and with a certain “rhythm”
between their verbalizations and button clicks (e.g., always clicking the “Done” button at
the instant they finished saying the last word). Although not all subjects exhibited this
behavior, it suggested that the self-priming effect observed for voice might be part of a
larger-scale automatization in which subjects began to progress mechanically through suc-
ceeding trials. Although it was clear that subjects were attending to the task (because their
picture descriptions were sensible), it was possible that their attention became somewhat
lax, which might reduce the effect of the contextual manipulation.
Accordingly, in an attempt to weaken this perseverative effect, and thus potentially
leave more room for the targeted interaction to take effect, this experiment introduced
an additional filler task between test trials. After describing each picture, subjects were
presented with a screen showing nine checkboxes randomly scattered around the screen.
Four of the checkboxes were already checked, and the subjects had to click on the other five
to check them in order to proceed to the next picture. (The instructions at the beginning
of the experiment were updated to tell subjects what to do on this task.) This served to
delay subjects between trials. It also disrupted any developing “rhythm” in their process.
Although the pictures and the “Done” button were always in the same screen position from
one trial to the next, the checkboxes were randomly repositioned each time, meaning that
subjects could not simply leave their mouse cursor hovering over the “Done” button, or
mechanically look to the same area of the screen every time, but had to actively engage
with the display.
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Aside from these changes, Experiment 3 followed the same procedure described above.
6.3 Results
Data from three subjects were excluded. One subject’s post-test response indicated that she
noticed a change in “tense” associated with the music; while the grammatical change be-
tween active and passive is not technically one of tense, it was obvious that this participant
had become aware of the link between language and nonlinguistic context. One subject was
excluded because she did not do the reading task during the prime phase, raising the possi-
bility that she had not really read the sentences. Finally, one subject was excluded because
the majority of her responses were not descriptions of the actual scenes but associative riffs
or evaluations (e.g., this woman shouldn’t have been a nurse for a picture of a nurse about to be
hit by a truck).
Of the 1344 responses given by the remaining 56 subjects, 1025 (76.3%) were ac-
tive/passive and the other 319 (23.7%) were agentless passive or “other”.
The active/passive responses were submitted to a logistic regression as described for ear-
lier experiments. The BlockedPrimes and BlockedTest predictors were not used, since as
described above all participants saw blocked primes and blocked test trials in this experi-
ment. The resulting model had a marginal R2 of 0.06, a classification accuracy of 74.8%
(compared with a baseline of 57.8%) and a point-biserial response correlation of 0.55. The
model is summarized below:
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Chisq Df Pr(>Chisq)
ActiveContext 0.2647 1 0.60690
Context 1.2312 1 0.26717
ActiveProp 25.0970 1 5.452e-07 ***
ActiveContext:Context 0.3962 1 0.52904
ActiveContext:ActiveProp 0.2126 1 0.64471
Context:ActiveProp 0.4088 1 0.52258
ActiveContext:Context:ActiveProp 3.2540 1 0.07125 .
The only effect significant at the 0.05 level was a main effect of ActiveProp; this was
the self-priming effect discussed previously.
There was also a marginally significant (p = 0:07) interaction of ActiveContext, Con-
text, and ActiveProp, summarizd in Figure 6.1. The nature of the effect was that the self-
priming tendency was stronger when subjects were hearing the “active music” (i.e., the
music they had heard while reading active-voice sentences) and weaker when they were
hearing “passive music”.
Again, however, a random-effects-only model fit on the same data slightly outperformed
the full model (CA 75.8%, point-biserial correlation 0.59).
Again, another model was fit including the agentless passive responses (of which there
were 85) as passives. This model was essentially identical to the original model, with no
additional significant effects. A random-effects-only model including agentless passives
likewise outperformed the corresponding mixed-effects model.
6.4 Discussion
The hypothesis of incidental learning of the music-voice association was not supported
here. Again the only significant effect found was a self-priming effect.
A marginally significant ActiveContext-Context-ActiveProp interaction was found. Re-
call that a similar effect was found in Experiment 1a. These effects indicate that the strength
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Figure 6.1: Interaction of ActiveContext, Context, and ActiveProp. The slopes of the lines indicate the
strength of the self-priming effect across the different conditions. The self-priming effect was strongest when
subjects were hearing the “active music” (top right and bottom left panels), and weaker when subjects were
hearing the “passive music” (top left and bottom right panels).
of the self-priming effect varied depending on whether subjects were in a context (i.e., see-
ing a color or hearing music) previously associated with active or passive voice. However,
the directions of the effects were different in Experiments 1a and 3. In Experiment 1a, the
self-priming effect was stronger when subjects saw the “passive color” and weaker when they
saw the “active color”; in Experiment 3, the self-priming effect was stronger when subjects
heard the “active music” and weaker when they heard the “passive music”.
These contradictory findings reduce the plausibility of an explanation of these effects in
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terms of the asymmetrical markedness of active and passive voice. If it were true that learn-
ing an association between passive voice and nonlanguage was somehow not the same as
learning an association between active voice and nonlanguage, due to the greater marked-
ness and lower frequency of passive voice, then it should be the case that the asymmetry is
consistent across different nonlinguistic context types. It is difficult to see why an associ-
ation between active voice and color would enhance the base structural priming tendency,
while an association between active voice and music would inhibit it.
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Chapter 7
Aggregate analysis of Experiments 1a-3
As noted earlier, the four experiments just described all used the same paradigm, in which
participants were exposed to a language-nonlanguage association in a prime phase and then,
in a test phase, described pictures accompanied by the nonlinguistic contexts from the prime
phase. Because the paradigms were exactly parallel across all experiments, it is possible to
consider their aggregate data together. In effect, this is like regarding all of them as different
conditions in one large experiment. Notably, this aggregate experiment has a much larger
sample size, increasing its statistical power and reducing the likelihood that a genuine effect
would be missed.
7.1 Results
Accordingly, a logistic regression was fit as described above, using all of the active/passive
responses data analyzed in all of the experiments. This data consisted of 2846 responses
from 152 subjects. The same predictors were used as in the models above. There were
of course cases where one experiment did not vary some of the predictors (e.g., Blocked-
Primes was always “blocked” for Experiment 3), meaning that the predictors were not all as
nearly balanced across the entire dataset as they were for the individual experiments, but
balanced data is not necessary for a mixed-effects model. The values of the ActiveContext
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and Context variables were converted to a common format, such that the color blue, the
“chime” sound, and the classical music were coded as “Context A” and the color red, the
“sad trombone” sound, and the jazz music were coded as “Context B”.
The resulting model had a marginal R2 of 0.05, a classification accuracy of 75.1%
(against a baseline of 56.6%), and a point-biserial response correlation of 0.55. The fi-
nal model is summarized below.
Chisq Df Pr(>Chisq)
ActiveContext 2.2375 1 0.13470
Context 0.2976 1 0.58540
BlockedPrimes 0.8766 1 0.34912
BlockedTest 0.0820 1 0.77457
ActiveProp 51.3259 1 7.824e-13 ***
StimIndex 0.1803 1 0.67115
ActiveContext:Context 0.4155 1 0.51917
ActiveContext:BlockedPrimes 0.0321 1 0.85784
ActiveContext:BlockedTest 3.2910 1 0.06966 .
Context:BlockedPrimes 0.2588 1 0.61095
BlockedPrimes:BlockedTest 0.8126 1 0.36735
BlockedPrimes:StimIndex 0.0813 1 0.77555
BlockedTest:StimIndex 0.0285 1 0.86587
ActiveContext:Context:BlockedPrimes 2.8877 1 0.08926 .
BlockedPrimes:BlockedTest:StimIndex 3.1602 1 0.07546 .
The only effect significant at the 0.05 level was the self-priming effect of ActiveProp.
There was a marginally significant (p = 0:08) three-way interaction between ActiveCon-
text, Context, and BlockedPrimes. As shown in Figure 7.1, this effect did not represent
an occurrence of the predicted ActiveContext-Context interaction in some subgroups of
participants. Although the likelihood of active vs. passive varied from one condition to
another, it did not have any consistent relationship with the nonlinguistic contexts that
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Figure 7.1: Interaction between ActiveContext, Context, and BlockedPrimes. Although there were differ-
ent patterns of active/passive response in different conditions, the results do not show any clear interaction
between ActiveContext and Context.
were associated with the voices.
There were alsomarginally significant interactions of BlockedPrimes-BlockedTest-StimIndex
and ActiveContext-BlockedTest. Because these interactions do not involve the experimen-
tal manipulation, they do not make any statement about participants’ ability to learn the
incidental association between context and voice.
A random-effects-only model was again fit, and again outperformed the model including
fixed effects, with a classification accuracy of 76.5% and a point-biserial correlation of 0.58.
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An additional mixed-effects model was fit including the agentless passives (of which
there were a total of 244) as passives. In this case, the resulting model showed some differ-
ences from the model without agentless passives, but the differences were not germane to
the hypothesis. Specifically, the agentless-passive model the three marginally-signficant in-
teractions mentioned above became wholly nonsignificant (p > 0:1). A new interaction of
ActiveContext, ActiveProp, and StimIndex was significant (p < 0:05) and an interaction of
Context, BlockedPrimes, and ActiveProp was marginally significant (p = 0:7). Neither of
these interactions involved the targeted ActiveContext-Context relationship, so again they
have no bearing on whether subjects’ responses were sensitive to the primed associations.
A random-effects-only model including agentless passives outperformed its correspond-
ing mixed-effects model by a similar margin as for the models without agentless passives.
In addition, a similar aggregate model was fit including an Experiment variable, which
took on a different value for each experiment. This allowed for the possibility of discovering
different patterns of effects across experiments which might not be visible in the separate re-
sults of each individual experiment. The results of this model, however, were essentially the
same as those of the model without the Experiment variable, with no hypothesis-relevant
differences. The only significant predictor involving the Experiment variable was a three-
way interaction of Experiment-Context-ActiveContext. Although this interaction involved
the targeted predictors, it did not convey meaningful information beyond the results of
the individual experiments: the nature of the interaction was simply that the Context-
ActiveContext interaction went in different directions across experiments — without being
significant in any of the individual experiments except Experiment 3, where its direction
was opposite to the prediction. This is what was already reported, and is consistent with
the interpretation given for the individual experiments, namely that the contextual manip-
ulations had little or no systematic impact on participant’s choice of voice.
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7.2 Discussion
Considering the four earlier experiments collectively increased the sample size to 152 par-
ticipants. This potentially increases the chance of detecting an effect that was too small to
reach significance in any of the individual experiments. Instead, however, what was found
was that the various interaction effects observed in the earlier experiments vanished when
aggregated with additional data, leaving essentially nothing but the self-priming effect.
For instance, although in Experiment 1a it was found that the predicted context-dependence
existed only for subjects who saw blocked primes, no such effect was found with the ag-
gregated data. In Experiments 1a and 3, interactions were found between ActiveContext,
Context, and ActiveProp. Although the effects were in opposite directions in the two ex-
periments, they raised the possibility that the experimental manipulation might affect pro-
duction only indirectly, by modulating the otherwise dominant self-priming effect. In the
aggregate data, however, this interaction also disappeared. This suggests that, if those ad-
ditional interactions represent genuine effects, they are very small.
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Chapter 8
Experiment 4: Room
8.1 Participants
Subjects were 55 undergraduates, recruited as described for earlier experiments. None had
participated in any of the other experiments.
8.2 Methods
In this experiment, the nonlinguistic context that was manipulated was the room itself:
participants performed the test phase of the experiment either in the same room where
they had performed the prime phase, or in a different room.
The procedure had to be altered somewhat for this experiment. The base paradigm
described above required multiple shifts from the Active Context to and from the Passive
Context. However, if changing contexts required the participant to physically move to
another room, this could require the participant to move back and forth between two rooms
up to three times during the experiment. This would likely tip participants off that the
change of room had some significance; it would also introduce logistical problems in syncing
a single participant’s data across multiple sessions spread over two computers in two rooms.
Therefore, in Experiment 4, the paradigm was altered so that the manipulation was
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done between subjects instead of within subjects. In the prime phase, each subject saw
sentences in only one voice (either active or passive).
There were two rooms, the Dark Room and the Light Room. All participants began the
experiment in the Dark Room and performed the prime phase in that room. After each
participant had completed the prime phase, the experimenter led the participant into the
Light Room to wait for a moment. The experimenter then checked the computer in the
Dark Room for an indication of whether this participant was assigned to a Same Room
or Different Room condition.1 If the participant was in the Same Room condition, the
experimenter set up the test phase on the computer in the Dark Room and brought the
participant back into the Dark Room to perform the test phase. If the participant was in
the Different Room condition, the experimenter set up the test phase on the computer in
the Light Room and the participant remained in the Light Room for the test phase.
Thus, all participants performed the prime phase in the Dark Room, and all participants
then waited for a moment in the Light Room, but half of the participants went back into
the Dark Room for the test phase, while the other half stayed in the Light Room for the
test phase. Half of all participants saw active-voice sentences in the prime phase, while the
other half saw passive-voice sentences. Thus, the design created a 2x2 crossing of Prime
Voice (active or passive) with Test Room (same or different).
As a result of these change, the nature of the hypothesis was somewhat different for
Experiment 4. Because each participant saw sentences in only one voice, some degree of
syntactic priming was to be expected for all subjects. The hypothesis was that subjects in
the Same Room condition would show a stronger priming effect (i.e., be more likely to use
the voice they had been primed with) than subjects in the Different Room condition.
The two rooms were adjacent and similar in size, but were set up to have different
atmospheres. In the Dark Room, the blinds were closed, the lights were turned off, and
the desk faced away from the window. (The light switch in the room was taped over so
1For this experiment, the software was modified to include a “secret button”, not visible to the partic-
ipants, which enabled the experimenter to access this condition information. However, the experimenter
remained blind to whether the subject had been primed with active or passive voice.
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that participants could not turn the lights on themselves.) The computer screen was lit,
and some light filtered through the blinds and through the door (which had a grating of
wooden slats), so the room was far from pitch black, but it was noticeably dark. In this
room, participants sat on a hard plastic classroom chair. In general, the two room were set
up so as to differentiate, as much as possible, the overall sensory experiences of being in
each of them.
In the Light Room, on the other hand, the desk faced the window, which had the blinds
raised. The window had a view of the sky and a courtyard outside. The overhead light in
this room was kept on, so that it was quite bright. In addition, participants sat in a soft,
cushioned conference chair.
8.3 Results
Data from 9 subjects were excluded. Six subjects noticed that all the sentences they saw
were in the same voice. Two subjects indicated a suspicion that the experiment was attempt-
ing to influence the phrasing of their picture description. Finally, no audio was recorded
for one subject, apparently due to a problem with the microphone.
There was thus a much higher rate of reported awareness of linguistic form in this ex-
periment, relative to the others (eight in this one experiment versus a total of four in all the
other experiments). This is probably due to the between-subjects design, which exposed
each participant to only one voice. In the earlier experiments, although some subjects were
exposed to blocks of a single voice, all eventually saw equal numbers of sentences in both
active and passive voice. Since use of both voices is unremarkable in discourse, this was
not likely to attract attention. In this experiment, though, participants were only exposed
to one voice, and the mere fact of seeing only one voice might be noticeable. Interestingly,
only one subject noticed when all sentences were in active voice, while five noticed when
all were in passive voice, perhaps due to the greater markedness of passive voice. This in-
terpretation is bolstered by the fact that, of the eight subjects who reported some awareness
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of voice (or “sentence structure” or the like), seven had been exposed to passive voice and
only one to active voice. Since the passive voice is regarded as the more marked, it makes
sense that subjects would be more likely to notice when the sentences were all passive than
when they were all active.
Of the 1104 responses from the remaining 46 subjects, 848 (76.8%) were active/passive
and the other 256 (23.2%) were agentless passive or “other”.
The active/passive responses were submitted to a logistic regression. Since the experi-
mental design for this experiment differed somewhat from the others, some of the predictors
were different. There were no Context, ActiveContext, BlockedPrime, or BlockedTest pre-
dictors; since each participant saw only one voice and performed the test phase in only one
room, there was no distinction between different contexts within subjects, and all stimuli
were effectively “blocked”.
Instead, the two predictors used were PrimeVoice and SameRoom. PrimeVoice indi-
cated the voice (active or passive) with which a participant had been primed during the
priming phase. SameRoom indicated whether the participant did the test phase in the
same room as the prime phase (i.e., the Dark Room) or in a different room (i.e., the Light
Room). In addition to these two, the predictors ActiveProp and StimIndex, as well as the
random effects for SubjID and PicName, were included as described for earlier experiments.
In this case, the prediction was that participants in the same-room condition would
be more likely to use the voice they had been primed with than would participants in the
different-room condition. That is, an interaction between SameRoom and PrimeVoice was
predicted. Note that there was no crucial prediction about the main effect of PrimeVoice.
Clearly, one would expect that participants primed with active voice would be more likely to
use active voice than participants primed with passive voice; however, the crucial prediction
in this case was that such an effect should be enhanced if the participants additionally
remained in the same room.
The resulting model had a marginalR2 of 0.15, a classification accuracy of 73.5% (com-
pared with a baseline of 52.6%), and a point-biserial response correlation of 0.54. The
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Figure 8.1: Interaction between PrimeVoice and SameRoom. When participants remained in the same room,
they were more likely to use the voice they had not been primed with. When they went to a different room,
they were more likely to use the voice they had been primed with.
model is summarized below:
Chisq Df Pr(>Chisq)
PrimeVoice 0.7511 1 0.3861248
SameRoom 0.0048 1 0.9450003
ActiveProp 35.0642 1 3.19e-09 ***
StimIndex 2.2147 1 0.1366985
PrimeVoice:SameRoom 7.5433 1 0.0060234 **
PrimeVoice:StimIndex 11.1204 1 0.0008539 ***
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PrimeVoice*StimIndex effect plot
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Figure 8.2: Interaction between PrimeVoice and StimIndex. The self-priming effect was strong for participants
primed with passive voice, and weakly reversed for participants primed with active voice.
The predicted interaction of PrimeVoice and SameRoom was significant. However, as
shown in Figure 8.1 the direction of the effect was a complete reversal of the prediction:
when they remained in the same room for prime and test, participants tended to use the
voice they had not been primed with, whereas when they went to a different room, they
tended use the voice they had been primed with. This effect is all the more puzzling because
participants were exposed to only one voice. This means that, for instance, participants,
when sitting in the original room to describe pictures, actually used more passive voice than
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average only if they had not been exposed to passive voice at all.
There was also a significant interaction between PrimeVoice and StimIndex, shown in
Figure 8.2. Recall that the Y axis in these plots represents the likelihood of using passive
voice. The ascending line in the left panel, therefore, indicates that participants primed
with active voice had a slight tendency to use more and more passive voice over the course
of the picture-description task; conversely, participants primed with passive voice had a
stronger tendency to use more and more active voice as the experiment went on. This can
be interpreted as a decaying effect of the prime voice: participants primed with active voice
used more active voice at the beginning of the picture description task, when the prime
was “fresh”, but gradually reverted to using more passive voice, and vice versa for those
primed with passive voice. The asymmetry of the slopes again may reflect an asymmetry
in markedness between active and passive: participants drifted back to the use of the un-
marked active voice more quickly than they drifted back to the use of the marked passive.
Finally, there was a strong main effect of ActiveProp, again indicating a self-priming
effect.
A random-effects-only model was again fit on the same data, and, as in the other exper-
iments, it slightly outperformed the model with fixed effects (classification accuracy 75.4%
vs. 73.5%; point-biserial response correlation .58 vs. .54).
The analysis was redone including agentless passive responses (of which there were 64)
as passives. The resulting model was not meaningfully different from the model without
agentless passives.
8.4 Discussion
The hypothesis of a context-dependent priming effect was not supported. There was a
context-dependent effect, but the effect was opposite to the prediction, such that partic-
ipants for whom the prime context was reinstated (i.e., who were in the same room for
prime and test phases) preferentially used the voice they had not been primed with. This
85
effect is difficult to explain in terms of mechanisms based on cooccurrence patterns. It is,
for instance, difficult to reconcile this result with the claim that “repeated inferences made
in context become part of the meaning of a word” (Bybee 2010: 55). Even if one were to
argue that incidental information, such as the ambiance of the surrounding room, is not
likely to be the basis of such inference and would not influence later use, it is hard to see
why such information should produce the opposite result, whereby participants in effect
“inferred” that a particular syntactic structure was not to be used just in the very context
where they had seen it used.
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Chapter 9
Power analysis
One potential criticism of the experimental results reported here is that the sample size was
not large enough, and/or the design not sensitive enough, to detect any effect of plausible
size. In order to assess this, a Monte Carlo-based power analysis was conducted: a series of
simulations were run in which simplified versions of the logistic regression models were fit
on data that was computer-generated to fit the overall profile of the actual data. This anal-
ysis essentially simulated results of experiments using the same paradigm as Experiments
1a-3.
Specifically, for each simulation, 40 fake “subjects” were generated, each of which gave
responses of either “active”, “passive” or “other” according to certain probabilistic param-
eters. (Note that all experiments reported in the preceding chapters except Experiment 1b
had a sample size at least this large.) Each “subject” had a baseline propensity to respond
with “active” rather than passive voice, with this propensity chosen from a normal distribu-
tion whose mean and standard deviation matched those of the distribution of active/passive
ratios of the subjects in the actual data (aggregated over Experiments 1a-3). In addition,
to represent each picture’s baseline “affordance” for description with each voice, a baseline
active/passive probability was assigned to each picture stimulus, equal to the overall ratio of
active and passive responses given for that picture (again, aggregated over all experiments).
For each “subject”, 24 responses were then generated probabilistically as follows:
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1. One response was generated per subject, per stimulus picture (as in the actual data).
2. Each subject had a 22% chance of giving an “other” response (neither active nor pas-
sive) on each trial. (This was the approximate overall proportion of “other” responses
in the data.)
3. If the subject did not give an “other” response, its probability of responding with “ac-
tive” was the average of the subject-specific baseline and the stimulus-specific base-
line, except that. . .
4. In order to mimic the self-priming effect observed with actual subjects, this prob-
ability was adjusted in a manner proportionate to the value of ActiveProp for that
trial — that is, simulated “subjects” who had given more active responses so far were
more likely to give another active response, and those who had given more passive
responses were more likely to again give a passive response.1
Each response had an associated Context and ActiveContext as in the real experiments2, but
these were not used in generating the initial response. Thus, these generated responses were
sampled randomly from the space of possible responses, according to general parameters
that approximately matched the distribution of the observed data.
Then, in a separate “effect-generation” step, to simulate an “effect size” of the targeted
context-dependence effect, individual responses were altered to conform to the hypothesis.
For each subject, some number of individual responses which were contrary to the hypoth-
esis — that is, for which an “active” response was predicted but a “passive” was produced,
1Specifically, the adjustment was ActiveProp 0:52 : the subject’s probability of responding “active” was
adjusted by this proportion in the direction of the currently-more-frequent response. For instance, if 75% of a
subject’s responses so far had been active, the adjustment would be 0:75 0:52 = 0:125; thus the probability was
moved 12.5% of the distance from the pre-adjustment probability toward 1. (If 25% of the subject’s responses
had been active, the probability would have been moved 12.5% toward zero.) So if the pre-adjustment
probability (average of subject and stimulus probabilities) was 0.6, the adjusted probability would be 0.65 —
that is, 12.5% closer to 1. No theoretical status is claimed for the details of this adjustment mechanism; it
was simply a heuristic designed to “nudge” response probabilities in a manner that roughly approximated the
self-priming behavior observed in actual subjects.
2That is, each “subject” was assigned an “active context” of either A or B, and then gave 12 responses in
that context and 12 in the other.
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or vice versa — were switched so that they conformed with the hypothesis. The amount of
alteration— howmany trials per subject had to be “forced” into conformance above and be-
yond the aforementioned “foundation” of subject-specific baselines, item-specific baselines,
and self-priming adjustments — thus represents the size of the targeted context-dependence
effect. Three different effect sizes were simulated, as described below.3
The above procedure was run 500 times to generate 500 simulated datasets of 40 “sub-
jects” each. Each of these datasets was then submitted to a logistic regression using only
the predictors Context, ActiveContext, and ActiveProp, and their two-way interactions, to-
gether with random effects for SubjID and PicName. The full model-selection process was
not run, and the model was not whittled down to retain only significant predictors; rather,
what was inspected was how often the initial model — including all three predictors and
all their interactions — had a significant Context-ActiveContext interaction in the correct
direction (such that context-congruent responses were more likely).4
The proportion of simulated models which found such an effect gives an indication of
the statistical power of the procedure. Since the hypothesized effect was built into the
simulation process (in the effect-generation step), an ideal model ought to be able to detect
it. The proportion of models that failed to find the effect represents the probability of failing
to detect a genuine effect (a so-called “Type II error”, whose probability is denoted by ).
Traditionally, a  of 0.2 is considered acceptable — that is, researchers accept that, about
20% of the time, their procedures will fail to detect an effect even when it really exists. A 
of less than 0.2 is conservative (i.e., the analysis is very unlikely to miss a genuine effect),
and a  exceeding 0.2 is generally considered unacceptable (i.e., it poses too high a risk of
3Note that the term “effect size” here does not refer to an effect size measure such as a coefficient in the
logistic regression. Rather, “effect size” refers to the actual strength of the effect on subjects’ responses, in
the practical sense of how many responses were altered from the random-baseline response that would be
expected by chance. For instance, an effect that managed to induce each participant to respond in a context-
congruent manner on two trials is a stronger effect than one that induced a context-congruent response on
just one trial per subject.
4This abbreviated model fitting process was chosen both in order to make the simulation computationally
tractable, and to simplify comparison across the simulated and real datasets. Essentially, this process restricted
focus to only those predictors which had a consistent impact on the models fit on the actual experimental
data — namely, ActiveProp and the random effects — and then added the targeted predictors (ActiveContext
and Context).
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missing a genuine effect).
Three such 500-dataset simulations were run, with different effect sizes. The first simu-
lation used an effect size of one response per subject, meaning that in the effect-generation
step, one response per subject was switched into conformance— that is, one trial that would
otherwise have had active response in a passive context, or vice versa, was switched so that
the “right” response was produced. In this case, 404 of the 500 simulated datasets pro-
duced a Context-ActiveContext interaction that was in the right direction and significant
at p < 0:05. This corresponds to a  of 0.192 — almost exactly the same as the traditional
0.2 value. This means that the sample size and procedures used in these experiments had
sufficient power to detect an effect at traditionally accepted levels of significance, even if
the effect was only strong enough to influence a single response for each subject.
The second simulation used an effect size of two responses per subject: that is, two re-
sponses per subject were switched into conformance. In this case, all 500 of the simulated
datasets found the effect. This corresponds to a  of 0, which is considerably more conser-
vative than the traditional level. (In fact, it represents a 0% chance of a false-negative error,
which is not really achievable in practice.) This means that the sample size and procedures
used here had ample power to detect an effect that was strong enough to influence two
responses per subject — indeed, if the real effect in any of the experiments had been this
strong, it would almost certainly have been detected.
Finally, in order to check that the simulation procedure was not inherently biased to-
wards producting significant results, a third simulation was run without the effect-generation
step — that is, only the subject-specific and picture-specific baselines and the self-priming
adjustments were used, so the simulated effect size was zero. In this case, only 25 of the
500 simulations produced Context-ActiveContext interactions signficant at p < 0:05 (in
any direction); thus the proportion of actual spurious effects was 0.05, exactly matching
the p-value criterion. This means that the simulation was not inherently biased towards
generating significant effects in line with the hypothesis, so we can be confident that the
simulation was a reasonable recreation of the chance-baseline situation in the actual exper-
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imental task.
Note that, since each subject completed 24 trials, even changing two responses repre-
sents an observable effect on less than 10% of trials. With simulated data for this effect
strength, the effect was detected 100% of the time. Thus, if the experiments conducted
here missed a genuine effect, that effect was most likely rather small.
Obviously, this simulation process only crudely represented the chance-baseline behav-
ior of the subjects, since the only parameters used were subject-specific and stimulus-specific
active/passive response probabilities. It should be remembered, however, that in all of the
actual experiments, a random-effects only model, making use of essentially the same infor-
mation, performed better than the model accounting for the fixed effects. In other words,
subject-specific and item-specific baselines apparently go a long way toward explaining the
entirety of the actual experimental results — and yet the simulations show that a genuine
effect, even a rather small one, could have been detected despite this high level of “back-
ground noise”. This strongly suggests that the actual experiments did not fail to find an
effect simply because the design or statistical analysis were weak, or because the sample
sizes were inadequate, but because there really was no sizable effect to be found.
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Chapter 10
General discussion
Taken as a whole, the results reported here do not provide support for the foundational
UBTL hypothesis that speakers’ usage of linguistic forms across contexts is a direct reflec-
tion of their experience with those forms across those contexts — although neither do they
provide strong evidence against this hypothesis. In these experiments, although the associ-
ation between voice and nonlinguistic context in the prime phase was always 100% reliable,
there was no consistent effect of context on participants’ choice of voice in the test phase.
Of course, there are many possible explanations for a null result. I will here address
several such explanation, and argue that there is reason to believe that the null result here
is of theoretical interest.
Perhaps the simplest explanation for the null result is that the sample sizes were too
small. The power analysis presented earlier offers strong evidence that this is not the case.
An additional argument against the insufficient-power criticism is that the sample sizes in
these experiments were at least as large as those in previous experiments which did find
a linguistic priming effect or a context-dependent memory effect. The five experiments
reported here had effective sample sizes (i.e., not counting excluded participants) of 41, 15,
40, 56, and 46; the aggregate analysis of Experiments 1a-3 covered 152 subjects. As regards
linguistic priming, Bock (1986) reported syntactic priming effects in three experiments
with 48 subjects each; Branigan et al. (2000) reported syntactic priming in a dialogue task
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with 24 subjects; (Hartsuiker et al. 2004) found cross-linguistic syntactic priming with
24 subjects. Within research on context-dependent explicit memory, (S. M. Smith 1985,
Experiment 1) obtained significant results using a musical context with 54 subjects; (S. M.
Smith et al. 1978, Experiments 1-3) found results using a room context with sample sizes
of 16, 24, and 20; (Godden and Baddeley 1975) found results using an underwater/on-
land context manipulation with subject sizes of 16 and 18. Work on implicit context-
dependent memory effects has tended to involve larger sample sizes, e.g., 192 subjects in
the homophone-spelling task of S. M. Smith et al. (1990, Experiment 1), 90 subjects in the
incidental word-memory study by Amanda Parker et al. (2001, Experiment 1), 65 to 93
subjects in the olfactory-context studies by Ball et al. (2010). However, the aggregate data
of Experiments 1a-3 fits comfortably within even this range, and implicit effects have also
been found with smaller sizes, e.g., 48 subjects in Amanda Parker et al. (2001, Experiment
2). As noted earlier, the studies by Gurevich et al. (2010) and Horton (2007) blend priming
and context-dependence, and these studies essentially obtained implicit context-memory
effects on language using quite small sample sizes. The verbatim-recall results of Gurevich
et al. were found in five experiments, two with 20 subjects and three with 24 subjects; the
partner-specific lexical priming effect was found by Horton in two experiments with sample
sizes of 16 and 20 subjects.
Clearly, a larger sample size increases the chance of finding an effect. Nonetheless, given
the substantial previous findings on the robustness of both syntactic priming and context-
dependent memory effects, even with relatively small sample sizes, it should be equally
clear that the sample sizes in the experiments reported here were not obviously too small.
In particular, the aggregate results of Experiments 1a-3, encompassing 152 subjects, draws
on a sample size considerably exceeding that in most syntactic priming research. The fact
that aggregating the results resulted in the disappearance of effects from the smaller individual
experiments suggests that, if anything, it was the positive results from those studies that
were more likely to be red herrings.
It could also be argued that the contextual manipulations used in these studies were
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not strong enough to produce a context-dependence effect. However, this argument is
unpersuasive, since earlier studies have used essentially the same context manipulations.
Dulsky (1935) found background-color dependence effects; S. M. Smith (1985) obtained a
context-dependence effect using the samemusical contexts used in Experiment 3; numerous
studies cited above have found a context-dependence effect when the manipulated context
was the room in which priming/testing took place. In addition, as discussed earlier, the
UBTL as currently articulated posits no particular constraints on what elements of the
context might be relevant1; as matters currently stand, therefore, any contextual element
is theoretically “in play” when it comes to effects on language.
Moving to more theoretical rather than methodological explanations, it should be noted
that, if we relax any of the UBTL assumptions outlined in the first chapter of this disser-
tation, the findings are easily explained. If we allow that the pattern-recognition process
may be domain-specific rather than domain-general, the lack of a result here could be due
to such domain-specificity; since the pattern was not linguistic, it might not be recognized.
If we allow that the rich-memory representations of an exemplar storage mechanism do not
in fact always retain all information about every aspect of speech situation, then it may be
that the nonlinguistic contextual information simply was not stored.2 If we allow that dif-
ferent cognitive mechanisms may be at work for different levels of linguistic structure, then
perhaps the syntactic level is not subject to the same cross-modal mapping processes that
may be active in lexical learning. Finally, if we allow that recognition of linguistic patterns
is restricted to (or at least highly privileged during) childhood, it may simply be that adult
participants are not able to learn associations of this sort.
Another possibility is that the frequency of the voice-context association was insufficient
to produce a noticeable difference in the participants’ mental representations. A good deal
of research (e.g. Bybee 2007; Bybee and Hopper 2001; Bybee et al. 1994) has argued that
1See the previously-cited statement by Bybee (2010) that rich memory representations of language “con-
tain, at least potentially, all the information a language user can perceive in a linguistic experience.”
2The small interaction effects that did involve the contextual manipulations could be explained by sup-
posing that the contextual information was retained in some cases but not others — for instance, only on trials
where the subject’s attention was for some reason drawn to the context — so that the association between
context and voice was more patchy.
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frequency is a key factor in the emergence of language structure. Although it is certainly
possible that an effect might be observed if the same experiment were re-run with a larger
set of stimuli, there are no specific theoretical grounds for this belief. Goldberg et al. (2004)
and Boyd and Goldberg (2012) found that adult subjects were able to learn an argument-
structure generalization from only 16 short film clips (although this learning was assessed
via a comprehension task rather than production). Horton (2007) reports that participants
formed an association between words and the identities of specific people based on only
32 critical stimuli (not counting fillers). Participants in the study by Gurevich et al. (2010)
apparently retained a significant memory trace of two 65-clause narrations over a duration
of roughly a week; although this is more than the 24 sentences seen by participants in the
present study, the fact that participants retained this information over such a long duration,
even without any specific contextual pattern to associate it with, at least suggests that
massive numbers of stimuli are not needed to successfully get tokens of language lodged in
participants’ brains. In short, while more stimuli, like more subjects, are always preferable,
there is no particular reason to think that frequency was the determining factor here, and
there are some previous studies suggesting that associations can be successfully created with
even fewer stimuli.
One could also make the argument that the associations between syntactic voice and
nonlinguistic context were ignored by participants because they were not meaningful. The
most straightforward response to this objection is to ask how we know what counts as
meaningful. For instance, in the studies by Boyd and Goldberg (2012) and Goldberg et al.
(2004), children and adults were exposed to novel verbs in a novel syntactic construction.
The “meaning” of the novel construction involved the act of appearance, and the differ-
ent verbs indicated different manners of appearance; this meaning was communicated via
videos of the various appearances, accompanied by sentences using the novel construction
and novel verbs. It is not immediately clear why participants would be sensitive to the
abstract notion of “appearance” as represented by a range of distinct videos, and yet not be
sensitive to extremely concrete regularities such as the recurrence of the exact same sound
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or color with individual sentences — nor is there currently any UBTL explanation for this.3
In addition, UBTL proponents have cited the artificial-language-learning literature (e.g.
Aslin et al. 1998; Saffran et al. 1999) as evidence of the power of pattern-recognition and
cooccurrence tracking even in the absence of meaning; for instance, Beckner et al. (2009:
5-6) say that “such studies indicate that subjects learn patterns even when the utterance
corresponds to nomeaning or communicative intentions”, implying that meaning is only in-
cidental to the pattern-recognition abilities proposed by the UBTL. In this case, it should
not matter whether the nonlinguistic context was “meaningful”; on the straightforward
UBTL view, it should be enough that it was a pattern. It should also be noted that the
experiment did not require participants to attribute meaning to the construction as such
in order for an effect to be found; the only hypothesis was that the cooccurrence pattern
would influence their syntactic choice — even if only in a nonconscious, noncommunica-
tive, mechanical way — not that it would influence the meaning they perceived in the scene
or attempted to convey in their description.
It is indeed unfortunate that we do not currently have a semantic theory that can clearly
tell us which kinds of experiences are meaningful and which are not. However, lacking such
a theory, it would be dubious to say that only “meaningful” associations can be learned,
since we do not really know which associations are meaningful a priori. Indeed, if, as in
Ibbotson’s (2013) characterization of the UBTL position, “the meaning is the sum total of
how the form is used in a communicative context”, then to stipulate meaning as a prereq-
uisite for associative learning is to put the cart before the horse: on this view, associations
actually become meaningful by virtue of our learning them.
3Goldberg (1998, 2006) has suggested that “constructions that correspond to basic simple sentence types
encode as their central senses event types that are basic to human experience” (Goldberg 1998: 205). As
examples, she offers “for example, someone causing someone to receive something (the double object con-
struction), something causing something to move (the caused-motion construction), or an instigator causing
something to change state (the resultative construction)” (Goldberg 1998: 205). However, there is no ex-
planation of how we are to know a basic pattern of experience when we see one. Even with Goldberg’s own
examples, it is not obvious why, for instance, “causing someone to receive something” is more “basic” than
simply receiving something, or why “causing something to move” is more basic than moving, or, on the other
hand, why either is more basic than “someone causing something”. If we are to use meaningfulness as a crite-
rion for pattern-learning, we need some independent, practical means of assessing how meaningful a situation
is.
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A related objection might be that, rather than the nonlinguistic context being too mean-
ingless, the linguistic context was too meaningful. Given that active and passive voice al-
ready have different pragmatics and preferred contexts of use, it could be argued that these
existing associations were too strong to be overridden, even partially, by the novel non-
linguistic association. However, this argument is difficult to reconcile with the extensive
structural priming literature; if even a single hearing of passive voice can apparently influ-
ence a speaker’s subsequent choice of active or passive (Bock 1986), it is hard to explain
why such a choice would be impervious to a patterned array of hearings of passive voice.
Moreover, the experiment only sought a quantitative shift in the proportion of the two
constructions, which is exactly the short of incremental shift which, in theory, might occur
of its own accord and instigate a larger-scale grammatical evolution (Bybee 2010, Chap.
7). If “there is no reason to suppose that quantitative changes in construction use cannot
occur in adults” (Bybee 2010: 118), one would imagine that, if ever there were a situation
where such quantitative change could occur, it would be in an associatively loaded situation
such as that provided by the experiments reported here.
A more general version of these objections might simply be that, as suggested by L. B.
Smith (2000: 170) and Ellis (2001: 42), attention is critical for the learning of associa-
tions, and therefore it is possible that subjects did not learn the context-voice association
because they did not (for whatever reason) attend to the context. There are a number of
rebuttals to this argument. First, as discussed in the introduction, although Ellis and other
UBTL theorists have mentioned the potential role of attention in a general way, there is
no straightforward hypothesis about when and how attention should be relevant. It is un-
clear, for instance, what it would mean for subjects in the “weird word order” studies (e.g.
Akhtar 1999) to be “attending” to the specific manners of appearance which constitute
the meaning of a novel lexical item, or how we would know whether they were doing so
(rather than just attending to the overall video stimulus), or indeed how we would know
whether they were doing so. More broadly, the notion that language users must attend to
dimensions of experience in order to extract regularity from them is conceptually at odds
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with most formulations of exemplar-based theory, which posit that features need only be
perceived (not attended), and that recognition of regularities is a separate cognitive process
operating on “raw” data in the rich-memory store (see, e.g. Pierrehumbert 2001: 141).
A second piece of evidence against an insufficient-attention explanation comes from
participants’ responses to the post-test question which probed their awareness of the ex-
perimental manipulation. As mentioned earlier in passing, a sizable number of subjects
responded to this question by inventing associations between the nonlinguistic context
and the meaning of the sentences, ignoring their syntactic form, or the scenes in the pic-
tures. A typical example comes from a subject in Experiment 3 (the music experiment),
who claimed to have noticed a pattern: “The pictures tended to have some sort of disaster
happening, or injuries were involved. As the injuries got potentially more fatal the music
crescendoed.” This subject obviously was attending to the music well enough to believe it
bore some thematic relationship to the pictures (even though, since the music played in
its own fixed tempo while the subject controlled her own pace through the pictures, it was
not possible for there to be a prearranged relationship between the two). Similar responses
were observed for the other contexts. Although subjects’ responses were not coded in de-
tail to assess how many made specific reference to the context, the repeated occurrence of
references like this makes it implausible to suppose that many subjects totally ignored the
nonlinguistic context.
Perhaps the strongest counter to an insufficient-attention explanation is that lack of
explicit attention to the context is very nearly de rigeur in context-dependent memory
studies. Indeed, such studies have often been at pains to ensure that subjects were not
paying special attention to the context, in order to eliminate the possibility that the effects
were driven by subjects’ deliberate, conscious retrieval of the context. S. M. Smith et al.
(1990: 239) say:
At the study session, subjects were not instructed or encouraged to attend to
the environment, nor was the context obviously related to the study material.
On the homophone spelling test, subjects were not instructed or encouraged to
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attend to either the context or the studied events. Therefore, the findings of
both experiments indicate that incidental background contextual information
is both stored in memory and used to probe memory without the obvious intent
of the subject.4
Since one goal of this dissertation was to test the relationship between context-dependent
memory and the UBTL’s exemplar/associative framework, it would not have been appro-
priate to draw subjects’ attention to the context. This does not mean that subjects need
to be totally oblivious to the context — as noted above, many subjects clearly were aware
of the contexts, just as subjects in the studies of S. M. Smith et al. (1990) were no doubt
aware of the visual appearance of the room around them. The point is simply that context-
dependent memory does not require “special” attention or deliberate intent to attend, and
thus, if such attention is necessary for the operation of the UBTL’s rich memory system,
then context-dependent memory as currently understood is apparently not operative in
that rich memory system.
Finally, another possible explanation for the lack of significant results in the studies
reported here is that the dependent measure — use of active versus passive voice — is too
coarse for a subtle effect such as context-dependent memory to manifest itself. In other
words, one might argue that syntactic priming can occur and context-dependent memory
can occur, but that context-dependent memory is too weak a force to influence syntactic
choice. This approach does not require abandoning any of the UBTL’s core positions per
se, but it requires facing up to their vagueness. Essentially, this objection amounts to saying
“the UBTL exemplar model doesn’t work like context-dependent memory” without saying
what the UBTL exemplar model does work like. It is certainly reasonable to conclude on the
basis of these results that the UBTL is probably not driven by context-dependent memory,
but this is in fact new and useful information, given that there are no other comparably
specific proposals for how the UBTL’s driving mechansisms actually operate.
4It is also worth noting that S. M. Smith et al. (1990) used implicit tests of memory — that is, subjects
not only were not told to attend to the context, but were not aware at test that their memory was what was
being tested (they believed that an earlier cover task was the memory task and was already over).
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In other words, the UBTL as it currently exists does not provide sufficient detail to craft
a realistic account of what sorts of experiences influence what sorts of linguistic behavior.
The current position within the UBTL is essentially that any contextual element could
influence any linguistic choice. It is clear from context-dependent memory studies that
contextual elements can influence various sorts of behaviors; it is also clear from structural
priming studies that syntactic choice can be influenced. If the two do not match up, then
the story is apparently not as simple as the current UBTL statements would have it. In
short, the UBTL allows that any contextual feature can potentially influence language use;
but because it does not say how to decide whether a given feature will actually influence
language use, it does not give us much traction on the task of actually grounding language
structure and patterns of use in patterns of experience. In such a situation, the natural
approach is to take known mechansisms with similar properties and try them out to see if
they produce the results the UBTL predicts.
Likewise, there are so far few or no accounts of the specifics of the memory mecha-
nism which supposedly underlies linguistic knowledge. Context-dependent memory is one
phenomenon whose properties make it a plausible candidate for this role, but the results
presented here do not support the proposal of context-dependent memory as the operative
force here. Therefore, again, more detail is needed in specifying the nature of the memory
system posited by the UBTL, and of the cognitive operations which rely on it, in order to
generate more precise predictions about how they should influence behavior.
It is also worth noting another implication of the results reported here: if contextual
changes can affect linguistic production, the effects are probably very small. In particular,
they are probably at least as small as the numerous other observed significant effects that
do not involve the hypothesis. As has been seen, there were many effects involving inter-
actions of “conditions” that were not really hypothesis-relevant manipulations, but simply
methodological hedges or counterbalances to avoid undue influence of details of the exper-
imental task. For instance, the UBTL hypotheses that motivated the study do not provide
any particular reason to suppose that the sound of a sad trombone would produce differ-
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ent priming effects than that of a chime, and yet in several cases effects of this type were
observed: effects were asymmetrical depending on which of the two nonlinguistic contexts
was used. The fact that such effects occurred along with the hypothesized priming effect,
and then disappeared along with it in the aggregate analysis of experiments 1a-3, suggests
that even instrinsic influences of individual contextual elements may be as powerful as reli-
able regularities in their cooccurrence with language. In other words, even if the association
of a sad trombone sound with passive voice has an effect on syntactic production, it may
be that that effect is as weak as the intrinsic effect (whatever its source) of a sad trombone
sound on syntactic production, regardless of what voice that sound was associated with.
Although such “intrinsic” influences of particular stimuli are themselves presumably the re-
sult of associations formed throughout life, this illustrates the difficulty of providing a clear
specification of what sorts of patterns can be incorporated into linguistic representations:
there is no obvious way for the system to separate the regularities that represent signal from
those that represent noise.
The one consistent finding across all experiments is the self-priming effect: the more
participants have used a particular voice, the more likely they are to continue using it. This
is essentially a replication of the basic structual priming effect: exposure to a structure such
as voice (in this case, by using it oneself) increases the likelihood of use of the same structure
again. It is important to note, however, that this effect is non-associative with regard to the
parameters of the experiment. That is, although there was a completely reliable correlate
of voice during the priming phase (namely the nonlinguistic contextual variable), it does
not appear to be the case that use of a particular voice in that context strengthened the as-
sociation between the voice and that correlate, at least not enough to influence subsequent
production.
Thus, if we take as given that, as Pickering and Ferreira (2008) suggest, “hearing or pro-
ducing the prime strengthens the processing sequence that yielded the prime structure”,
the present results do not support the hypothesis that the processing sequence yielding
passive voice takes account of the nonlinguistic context during that processing. Alterna-
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tively, if instead we take as given that processing of the passive voice is part and parcel
of processing the entire nonlinguistic context, then the present results do not support the
hypothesis that perceiving the prime strengthens that processing sequence. In other words,
the present results do not support the dual assertion that language processing takes account
of the nonlinguistic context, and that things which are processed together thereby form an
associative link. These are both core tenets of much usage-based work. Therefore, either
one or both of these assumptions should be revised or abandoned.
At the same time, it is important to note that the current findings do not in themselves
falsify any of these tenets. Taken jointly and at face value, the various core claims of the
UBTL would predict results that were not found here, and thus, as noted above, the current
findings do not support these claims taken jointly and at face value. However, as also
discussed above, relaxing any one of several core claims would provide an explanation for
the null results; therefore, even if some of the claims are false, the present results do not
allow us to know which ones they are.
Moreover, it is possible that all the claims could be preserved in their general form if
they were tempered by additional constraints on the kinds of context that are stored, the
kinds of patterns that can be extracted, the amount of data required for such patterns to be
extracted, etc. One simple and plausible constraint would be that the pattern-recognition
system does not generally track cooccurrences between language and non-focal elements
of nonlinguistic experience. Since the focus of the experimental task was obviously on the
displayed sentence/picture and not the color/music/sound/room, these contextual elements
may have been ignored by the pattern-recognition system, even if they were attended by
subjects at least part of the time. Another plausible constraint would be that adults do not
track cooccurrences along dimensions which have not been informative in their experience
so far — that is, that we learn what aspects of experience to ignore, and that we have learned
to ignore color/music/sound/room, and disregard them as possible sources of information
about language-relevant patterns. Such constraints are very likely necessary in order to
rein in the scope of the patterns recognizable under the UBTL. Crucially, however, detailed
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work is needed to decide what constraints are operative, and until that work is done, the
UBTL leaves us in the dark about what is going on when regularities of experience do not
seem to have any effect on language use.
As outlined in the introduction, various researchers have provided considerable evidence
for the various tenets of the UBTL; therefore, the conclusion here should not be that the
theory, or even any of its individual claims, are hopeless, but rather that a great deal more
work is necessary to flesh those claims out and explain how they interact with one another.
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Chapter 11
Conclusion
Although the results reported here are not supportive of the broad claims of the UBTL,
I do not wish to argue that the UBTL is therefore on the wrong track. Rather, what I
suggest is that the UBTL has well-enough established its overall gist, and that it is time to
begin nailing down the specifics. As noted earlier, we have ample evidence for many of the
individual tenets of the UBTL — that domain-general processes are active in language use,
that memory plays a role, etc. The next step is to move from arguing that such factors play
a role to crafting explicit, predictive accounts of exactly how they work — that is, under
what conditions do what kinds of language structures, mental representations of linguistic
structures, or patterns of linguistic behavior emerge?
Like many functionally-oriented theories of language, the UBTL claims that what speak-
ers know about their language is influenced by a broad array of factors, many of them not
purely or inherently linguistic in nature. More specifically, it is claimed that cooccurrence
patterns among various dimensions of experience will affect mental representations of lan-
guage. However, it is important to distinguish between three levels of strength at which
such a claim may be framed, each of which makes correspondingly strong predictions. The
weakest version of the claim is that language can be sensitive to such cooccurrence patterns;
this claim simply predicts that we will find at least some cases where patterns of experience
affect language structure, but they may be quite rare or peripheral. A stronger claim is that
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language, by and large, is sensitive to such patterns; this predicts that in general most lan-
guage structures will show the influence of patterns of experience in some way, but leaves
open the possibility that language structure may also be fundamentally driven by other
factors, with the pattern-based component as only a minor part of how any given language
structure works. The strongest claim is that patterns of experience are the core mechanism
by which language structures arise; this predicts not only that all language structures will
show the influence of patterns of experience, but that essentially everything about these
structures can be explained by reference to patterns of experience.
In short: is it the case that language can be influenced by patterns of experience, that
language is influenced by patterns of experience, or that language is created by patterns of ex-
perience?1 I believe we have substantial evidence for the first claim, a smaller but growing
body of evidence for the second claim, and relatively little direct evidence for the third. Re-
search in usage-based linguistics has accumulated a vast amount of evidence that linguistic
congition is not a hermetically sealed, autonomous module unaffected by life experience;
this research has moreover demonstrated that the interface between language and patterns
of experience is fairly pervasive. We have, in other words, evidence that “the set of cognitive
and neuromotor mechanisms or activities that are put into use in online communication
and in the mental storage of language” (Bybee 2010: 33) is sensitive to patterns of usage.
However, this is a long way from establishing Bybee’s subsequent claim that “the particular
way these processing mechanisms work determines fairly directly the facts about the nature
of language” (Bybee 2010: 33) — in large part because our understanding of “the particular
way these processing mechanisms work” is still quite vague.
Insofar as the UBTL’s basic claims make predictions about what kinds of behavior
should be observed in many situations, those predictions are extremely broad, and, as the
results presented here suggest, are not necessarily borne out. The UBTL predicts gener-
ally that “the structures of language emerge from interrelated patterns of experience, social
interaction, and cognitive processes” (Beckner et al. 2009: 2), but has so far placed few
1Perhaps an even stronger version would claim that language is constituted by patterns of experience.
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constraints on what sorts of patterns may thus give rise to language. This leaves many
unanswered questions about exactly how the emergence happens. If there is a regular pat-
tern of occurrence linking a linguistic structure and a contextual feature, will this cause
people to use the structure more, or differently? Will it produce a qualitiative change (e.g.,
use of a different construction) or a quantitative one (e.g., use of the same constructions in
different proportions)? Will it produce an effect only on comprehension but not on pro-
duction? How regular must the association be for these effects to be observed? How much
exposure must people have to the association for any of these effects to be observed? Is
the effect modulated by the specifics of the stimuli (i.e., the particular construction and/or
particular aspect of the context)? If so, how?
I suggest that our understanding of how language works would be greatly advanced by
a concerted effort to address these questions in a systematic way. By “a systematic way” I
mean the straightforward scientific enterprise of formulating specific proposals and testing
whether they work — that is, whether they are demonstrably powerful and versatile enough
to drive the construction of all language structure out of patterns of experience.
I emphasize that the broad gist of the UBTL may be correct even though it does not
yet address these questions — indeed, the evidence from various studies cited throughout
this dissertation strongly points in that direction. However, it is essential not to regard
questions such as the above as mere details which are needed only to iron out the wrin-
kles. These questions are central to the causal import of the UBTL. If “the particular way
these processing mechanisms work” is supposed to determine language structure, an explicit
characterization of that particular way is vital to the theory.2
In particular, it is important that the theory evolve beyond retrospective explanation
of existing grammar to the identification of causal factors which operate in a specifiable
and predictable way. A good deal of existing UBTL research reasons from effects to causes
— for instance, from existing constructions to past patterns of usage which are believed
2Ibbotson (2013) makes a similar point: “Usage-based theories need more psychologically plausible mod-
els of what gets treated as a chunk when, and hence ’counted’ in any distributional analysis [...] A key part of
responding to this challenge will be to specify in greater detail the mechanisms of generalization, specifically
a mechanistic account of the dimensions over which children and adults make (and do not make) analogies.”
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to have resulted in grammaticalization (e.g. Bybee 2007; Bybee and Hopper 2001; Bybee
et al. 1994). What we need now are predictions from causes to effects. It is not enough
to show that what already happened can be interpreted in terms of certain proposed past
causes; a solid theory needs to actually predict, on the basis of presently observed factors
that are believed to be causes, what effects will be observed in the future.
Given that virtually every aspect of language structure is likely to have multiple causes,
it is of course not necessary that every purported cause lead infallibly to its predicted effect
in every case. Nor it is necessary that the cause-effect relationship be tested exclusively
via experimental methods; it is quite possible to look at causes and effects by finding cases
where the cause occurred in naturalistic data, and seeing if the effect followed. (In other
words, we do not have to predict what will happen in the future, we only have to predict what
we will find in the future, before we actually go looking for it — even if where we eventually
go looking for it is also in data from the past.) The point is simply that we cannot assess
the power of the theory only by looking for the effects and seeing if the supposed causes
preceded them; we must take the hypothesized causes as a starting point, see how reliably
the effects follow, and keep score of which proposed causes actually produce the predicted
effects.
Currently, we have only a vague notion of what kinds of situations actually cause what
kinds of changes in language structure (or mental representations thereof). Claims such as
“the kind of constituency normally studied by syntacticians also has its source in language
use and frequency of co-occurrence. [...] Constructions [...] are conventionalized through
frequent use” (Bybee and Hopper 2001: 14) and “an exemplar is built up from a set of
tokens that are considered by the organism to be the same on some dimension” (Bybee
2010: 19) imply that similarity and cooccurrence are the driving factors. But does this
mean that whenever some experiences are similar and/or cooccur in some pattern, language
structure should be affected? If so, then we should look for every possible case of similar
and/or regularly cooccurring experiences and see if language structure really is affected.
If not, what additional information is necessary to predict what will actually happen? I
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concur with Bybee 2010: 62 that “the pressing need is for fully elaborated substantive
theories that predict which similarities will be important.” The present study, for instance,
suggests that similarities in incidental environmental context are not (or at most only very
weakly) important.
We must also avoid the related pitfall of identifying the hypothesized causes only via
their effects. As an example, consider the claim that “repetition of the same inferences
builds their strength in the exemplar representation of meaning and context. Eventually
the inferences become part of the meaning” (Bybee 2010: 159). If inference is the cause
and semantic change the effect, we must be careful to avoid analyzing only for those in-
ferences which have already been absorbed by semantic change. To show that patterns of
inference drive semantic change, we need to be able to identify inferences independently of
their conventionalization into semantic meaning. If we only investigate “successful” infer-
ences (i.e., those that did become conventionalized into semantics), we cannot know what
distinguishes them from the unsuccessful inferences (i.e., those did not make it into the
meaning).
Again, these are not minor details. A theory that predicts many effects that do not
happen is just as faulty as one that fails to predict effects that do happen, and in its current
form, the UBTL seems to predict many effects for which, at the least, we have little evidence
(such as those which the experiments reported here sought and, for the most part, did not
find). As Ibbotson (2013) notes, fixing this overprediction “would also go a long way
to engaging those from different theoretical approaches to language acquisition who are
skeptical of the usage-based approach for this reason — ‘what pattern of results couldn’t a
usage-based theory explain.’”
In the same vein, I stress that this issue of is not specific to any particular formulation
of the UBTL or its claims, but is fundamental to the very idea of a usage-based approach to
language. As mentioned in the introduction, although I have referred to “the” UBTL, there
is no single, monolithic, explicitly articulated theory as such, and hence I am not merely
claiming that the findings here support or refute specific claims by particular researchers.
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Rather, the core concept of language structure arising from usage is what is at issue here.
No matter how you slice it, the claim that language structure arises from patterns of us-
age ultimately requires affirmative demonstrations of a cause-effect relationship between
patterns of usage and language structure, and a thoroughgoing explanation of the causal
mechanisms by which the patterns of usage effect change in language structure.
It is important to note that the crafting of such a causal account is a fundamentally
different task from the gradual accumulation of findings about influences of patterns of ex-
perience on language structure. For instance, no matter how many results we obtain show-
ing that people retain detailed memory traces of linguistic experiences, and no matter how
many results we obtain showing that existing constructions have plausible origins in past
patterns of usage, we will never, by those findings, convincingly show that patterns of us-
age drive language structure. To do that, the findings in the areas of memory and historical
change (along with inference, chunking, cross-modal association, etc.) must be integerated
into a mechanistic account of how the system actually works as a whole. Findings demon-
strating influence of particular experiences on language structure are immensely useful in that
they draw us toward hypotheses about how the system works, but we still need to actually
test the resulting hypotheses directly to see whether the disparate individual findings can
in fact be melded into a coherent account.
In its current state, the UBTL predicts that any pattern in experience should be picked
up on by the language system. If this claim is true, we should be able to demonstrate this
by finding patterns of experience — either manufactured in an experiment or identified in
natural settings in a manner independent of their effects — and predicting their effects on
mental representations of language. If the claim is false, then there must be additional con-
straints on how the system recognizes patterns, and those constraints need to be identified
and built into the theory. In short, when we claim that language arises from usage, we have
committed ourselves to the claim that the patterns that are represented in language must be
there because certain patterns of experience “out-competed” other patterns in some way,
and thus were noticed and learned by the cognitive system. We need to know what the
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rules of that competition are: how does our cognitive apparatus select among the many
patterns that confront us?
Importantly, this enterprise must involve looking for patterns beyond language. As I
have emphasized throughout this dissertation, the domain-generality position of the UBTL
implies that whenever we make a claim about how patterns of experience affect linguistic
representations, we are also making a claim about how they affect mental representations
in general. The UBTL would therefore do well to draw on relevant work in fields outside
linguistics, not only at the general level of importing concepts such as memory and chunk-
ing, but at the more specific level of assessing in detail how the operation of these processes
within language is or is not parallel to their operation in other domains.
I have discussed memory in this context already: if memory is key to the UBTL, we need
to know whether properties of memory in other domains apply with regard to language,
and if not, we need to characterize the differences. The experiments reported here represent
an attempt to connect linguistic exemplar memory with at least one conceptually similar
phenomenon, namely context-dependent memory. Similar cross-disciplinary comparisons
are possible in other areas. As discussed in the introduction, modern conceptions of classical
conditioning (Jara et al. 2006; Perales et al. 2004; Rescorla 1988) suggest parallels to the
pattern learning posited by the UBTL. There is also more general research on inductive
learning (Holland et al. 1989). Reaching even further afield, processes or models similar
to those of the UBTL (e.g., analogy, pattern extraction, connectionism, emergence) have
been proposed to underlie consciousness (in philosophy, e.g. P. M. Churchland and P. S.
Churchland 1998; Dennett 1993; and in some cases formalized into mathematical models,
e.g., Laakso and Cottrell 2000), the self (in neuroscience, see Damasio 2012), and indeed
all of human thought — a recent general-audience volume (Hofstadter and Sander 2013)
is subtitled “Analogy as the fuel and fire of thinking”. Assessment of the domain-generality
of the UBTL’s proposed mechanisms would benefit from contextualization with respect to
their counterparts in these other domains.
The basic point is that a process is not domain-general just because we can label it with
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a word (such as “chunking”, “memory”, or “analogy”) that also labels processes in other
domains; a process is domain-general if we have evidence that it actually operates in the
same way across domains. It is just not possible to know whether the cognitive mechanisms
underlying language are domain-general without explicitly comparing them to nonlinguistic
cognitive processes.
In essence, the arguments above amount to saying that the UBTL’s reach currently ex-
ceeds its grasp. Although researchers have made immense progress in demonstrating how
language is sensitive to patterns of experience, including nonlinguistic experience, as yet we
have little evidence that patterns of experience are the fundamental cause of language struc-
ture. Within the UBTL, there have been broad claims about the ability of chunking and
cross-modal association to provide a framework for language; although there is consider-
able evidence that these processes are active and relevant, there is as yet no concrete, causal
account of how they work to produce actual grammars directly from patterns of experience.
There have also been broad claims that many incidental details of experience are stored in
a rich memory system; although there is considerable evidence that memory for language
may be richer than has been assumed, there is no concrete evidence to support the claim
that this memory system actually contains every aspect of every experience with language.
In addition, there is little explanation of where this memory system fits in relation to other
well-studied memory systems. Finally, the UBTL emphasizes the domain-generality of its
proposed cognitive mechansisms, such as analogy, chunking, and cross-modal association;
although there is evidence that such mechanisms can in principle be domain-general, there
is little direct evidence that what they do in the language domain is actually the same as
what they do in other domains. This is in large part because UBTL work to date has focused
primarily on language-internal patterns, whereas, if the cognitive underpinnings of language
are as powerful as the UBTL would have it, and are essentially domain-general, they ought
to also cognitively underpin a great deal of highly structured knowledge in other domains.
In other words, the UBTL actually predicts a lot about nonlanguage, but its implications
have only been considered with regard to language.
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In many of these areas, there are clear paths forward, some of which I have noted in
passing throughout this dissertation. For instance, the UBTL would benefit greatly from a
clarification of the role of meaning in the pattern-recognition process: is meaning a causal
factor in pattern-recognition (i.e., are we more attuned to meaningful patterns than to
meaningless ones, and if so, how do we know which is which?), or is meaning only a re-
sult of pattern-recognition (i.e., patterns acquire meaning by being recognized)? Studies
in language acquisition (e.g., the “weird word order” studies of Akhtar 1999 and others)
have already begun to demonstrate causal relations between patterns of experience and
language structure; we need to work on extending this causal predictiveness to synchronic
adult language, as well as to diachronic studies. Studies such as those by Horton (2007)
and Gurevich et al. (2010) offer tantalizing demonstrations of the cross-modal association
mechanism that is claimed to underlie language, but the experiments of the present study
suggest that there are limits on this mechanism; we need to narrow the gap between these
results, systematically investigating what kinds of associations are and are not learned.
In the tale of Ali Baba and the forty thieves, a bandit chalks a symbol on Ali Baba’s
house so that he and his comrades can return later to take their revenge on the unsuspecting
woodcutter. Ali Baba’s slave, however, notices themark, and she cleverly thwarts the thieves
— not by erasing the mark, but by drawing the same mark on all the nearby houses. This
tactic succeeds because, when the thieves return, it is not enough for them to return to the
correct house and see the mark; they cannot know which house is the right one unless they
also do not see the mark on any other house. When the UBTL’s reach exceeds its grasp as
described above, we risk being fooled in the same way. Evidence to date has made it quite
clear that language structure and use are sensitive to the factors posited by the UBTL —
that is, we can see the mark on the door. However, this does not mean that the UBTL’s
explanation of how these factors operate is correct, because those posited factors ought to
have much broader effects than the purely linguistic ones that have been studied — in other
words, it seems quite likely that the UBTL, in its generality, has marked every door in the
neighborhood. In order to hone in on a coherent, causal theory of language — Ali Baba’s
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true house, as it were — we need to begin erasing the extra marks by narrowing the theory
down.
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